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ABSTRACT 
The conventional reading of McCulloch v. Maryland maintains that the opinion established the 
constitutional foundations of a broad conception of congressional power.  This reading of 
McCulloch is part of a broader depiction of Chief Justice John Marshall as an “aggressive 
nationalist” and “nation builder” whose “spacious” interpretations of the powers of Congress 
contributed significantly to national unification and growth. 
This Article argues that the conventional account seriously misreads McCulloch by exaggerating 
its nationalism.  Marshall, though a nationalist, was far more cautious and moderate in his 
views than the standard story holds, and the text of McCulloch reflects significant ambivalence 
about most of its most celebrated principles.  In crafting the McCulloch opinion, Marshall 
systematically steered a moderate course relative to the arguments urged by the Bank’s defenders 
and other prominent nationalists of the time.  In particular, McCulloch avoided taking a clear 
position on any of the leading constitutional controversies of his day—internal improvements, a 
national power over the money supply, and the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Marshall also 
stopped conspicuously short of endorsing the Bank’s lawyers’ arguments for an extreme version of 
judicial deference to Congress’s choice of means and its interpretation of the scope of its own 
powers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
McCulloch v. Maryland1 is the “most canonical” of cases in Ameri-
can constitutional law.2  It is also the most misunderstood. 
Everyone accepts McCulloch v. Maryland as a decision of the high-
est importance in American constitutional law.  For over a century, 
constitutional scholars have agreed with James Bradley Thayer’s ap-
praisal in his 1901 biographical sketch of Chief Justice John Marshall, 
that McCulloch was “probably [Marshall’s] greatest opinion” and “the 
chief illustration” of Marshall’s “giving free scope to the power of the 
national government.”3  In 2014, Sanford Levinson spoke for the con-
tinuing consensus, when he said, “I personally regard [McCulloch] as 
the richest and most important single opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court in our entire history.”4 
Why is McCulloch seen as so important?  The answer is not hard to 
discern.  If Marshall was a “nation builder” as many constitutional 
scholars like to assert,  McCulloch was his signature nation-building 
achievement.5  The particulars of the consensus view are captured by 
legal historian Richard Ellis: 
[O]f [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions none has proved to be more signif-
icant than McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) . . . . Unquestionably, much of 
the praise for the decision, if extravagant, is merited . . . . Among other 
things, it provides an enduring nationalist interpretation of the origins 
and nature of the Constitution and the union and a broad definition of 
the necessary and proper clause (Article I, section 8), which has laid the 
foundation for the living Constitution, and with it the means for an al-
most infinite increase in the powers of the federal government.6 
We can call this consensus view the “aggressive nationalism thesis.”7  
The principal tenets of this thesis are that McCulloch (1) endorses a 
 
 1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 2 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963, 987 (1998). 
 3 James Bradley Thayer, Thayer on Marshall (1901), reprinted in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 66 (1967). 
 4 Sanford Levinson, A Close Reading of McCulloch v. Maryland, Offering in Harvard Law 
School Course Catalog, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Sept. 17, 2015, 1:31 PM), https://helios.
law.harvard.edu/coursecatalogs/hls-course-catalog-2014-2015.pdf.  For similar opinions 
in intervening years, see, for example, R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Southern 
Constitutional Tradition, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION:  CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE 
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 105, 108 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989) (ranking 
McCulloch as “possibly the most far-reaching decision ever handed down by the Supreme 
Court”); infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra text accompanying note 24. 
 6 RICHARD E. ELLIS, AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM 3–4 (2007). 
 7 I derive this label from Ellis’s fine, though aggressively titled, book-length study of McCul-
loch.  Id. 
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broad interpretation of national powers, and (2) established that 
broad interpretation in our constitutional doctrine once and for all.  
In this Article, I argue that the first of these tenets is greatly exagger-
ated if not false, and that the aggressive nationalism thesis is greatly 
overstated if not outright wrong.8 
The aggressive nationalism thesis has been reinforced by existing 
scholarship, which has always focused on the narrowly framed yes/no 
question of the constitutionality of the Bank, and thereby failed to 
ask the right questions.  Because McCulloch reached the result sought 
by nationalists—the “yes” answer, upholding congressional power to 
charter a national bank—the opinion seems to fit comfortably within 
an aggressive nationalism interpretation.  But legal historians have 
long shown that the constitutionality of the Bank in 1819 was not a 
controversial position, having been accepted by congressional majori-
ties and all five presidential administrations as of 1819.9  Thus McCul-
loch’s result by itself fit within a broad political consensus, and does 
not necessarily tell us as much about Marshall’s nationalism as we 
have assumed.  At the same time, historical scholarship on McCulloch 
has not dug deeper by asking how nationalistic Marshall’s “yes” really 
was:  whether the decision was aggressively nationalistic in compari-
son to the arguments available to or urged on the Marshall Court.  
Unfortunately, constitutional scholars take for granted that we have 
such a thorough understanding of the case that such an exercise 
would yield no insight.  Thus, “the opinion’s fame has not generated 
a commensurate level of academic commentary on the decision that 
the Court actually reached.”10 
In this Article, I present a fresh and significantly revised reading 
of McCulloch by examining the decision in two important historical 
contexts.11  First, I examine the history of the First and Second Na-
tional Banks, not as mere background, but in order to understand 
the full scope of the constitutional arguments in the McCulloch deci-
sion.  I focus on the arguments made over the years, and at the 
McCulloch oral argument itself, for sustaining the Bank.  The purpose 
is not to rehash the well-established point that Marshall’s opinion 
 
 8 The second tenet is likewise exaggerated or false, but requires its own separate article-
length treatment, which I undertake elsewhere. 
 9 See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 10 Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power:  Revisiting the Legal Tender 
Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 125 (2006). 
 11 Professor Levinson may be one of the few constitutional scholars who believes that a close 
reading of McCulloch can teach us something new.  He has devoted a recent law school 
seminar to such a project:  “It is almost literally the case that each of [McCulloch’s] 72 par-
agraphs is worth close analysis . . . .”  Levinson, supra note 4. 
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summarizes the arguments of Alexander Hamilton and others.12  Ra-
ther the point is to understand the limits of what Marshall actually 
said in McCulloch by considering the pro-Bank arguments he left out. 
Second, I expand the focus beyond the narrowly framed yes/no 
question of the constitutionality of the Bank itself to consider three 
closely related questions of constitutional power lurking immediately 
behind McCulloch.  These questions were hotly contested and hugely 
important.  The first was national control over the monetary system.  
Did the Federal Government have the power to impose a uniform na-
tional currency and thereby keep tight control over the chaotic sys-
tem of state banks that had become popular with Jeffersonian arri-
viste businessmen?  The second question involved the power of 
Congress to undertake national infrastructure projects, known as in-
ternal improvements:  did Congress have an implied power under 
one or more of the enumerated powers to build and maintain roads, 
canals and other infrastructure projects?  The third question, tied 
closely to the first two, was the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Could 
the commerce power be used as a basis to claim authority over the 
monetary system, since money is the medium of exchange?  Could it 
be used to support congressional power over internal improvements? 
If McCulloch lived up to its billing, the case should have addressed 
at least one, and possibly all three of the above issues—particularly 
the Commerce Clause—and adopted a nationalist position.  The ar-
guments for doing so were well established in the annals of congres-
sional debates, the reports of high profile executive branch officials 
like Alexander Hamilton and John C. Calhoun, and the McCulloch 
oral arguments themselves. 
However, as I will show, Marshall sidestepped or ignored one na-
tionalist argument after another in upholding the constitutionality of 
the Second Bank of the United States.  Marshall painstakingly avoid-
ed giving a broad interpretation to any enumerated power in a sys-
tematic effort to steer clear of any controversy over concrete ques-
tions of national power.  McCulloch was vexingly non-committal on 
those questions.  Contenting himself with upholding the Bank and 
refuting the most anti-federalist arguments for strict constitutional 
construction, Marshall declined to press matters any further. 
Nor can it be said that McCulloch’s holding on implied powers 
compensated for Marshall’s cautious approach to enumerated pow-
 
 12 See, e.g., CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE:  JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 122 (1996) (“Scarcely a passage in the first part of McCulloch could not be traced 
to Hamilton’s advisory opinion or to some earlier writing, speech, or legal argument.”). 
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ers.  While Marshall famously rejected the radical anti-federalist ap-
proach to implied powers, he stopped well short of embracing the 
most nationalistic position.  Moreover, implied powers are necessarily 
cabined by limits on the scope of enumerated powers, and Marshall 
promised, if somewhat ambiguously, that the Court would assume a 
significant role in policing those limits. 
In Part I, I elaborate on the aggressive nationalism thesis and set 
out criteria for properly assessing the extent of Marshall’s national-
ism.  I show how the historical scholarship taking a more measured 
view of McCulloch has had little impact on the mainstream interpreta-
tion of the case.  Part of the problem is a tendency of modern schol-
ars to confuse Marshall’s defensive (state-restraining, union-
preserving) nationalism with aggressive congressional-power-
expanding nationalism. 
Parts II and III re-examine the National Bank controversy, placing 
it in the broader context of debates touching on the commerce pow-
er, specifically the powers of the national government to regulate the 
money supply and to undertake internal improvements projects.  I 
examine constitutional questions and arguments linking these issues 
to that of a national bank, to show both the plain implications of the 
McCulloch decision for these related congressional power questions, 
and to highlight the constitutional arguments available to Marshall at 
the time of McCulloch. 
Part IV re-examines the McCulloch case with emphasis on the ar-
guments actually presented to the Court.  I then compare those ar-
guments to the opinion to see which were included and which were 
omitted by Marshall.  I show that Marshall systematically avoided tak-
ing a clear position on any of the three leading constitutional contro-
versies and also stopped conspicuously short of endorsing the Bank’s 
lawyers’ arguments for an extreme version of judicial deference to 
Congress’s choice of means and its interpretation of the scope of its 
own powers. 
Part V rounds out the story of McCulloch by examining the case’s 
lack of impact on the question of internal improvements in the years 
immediately following the case.  I consider how two significant 
events—Marshall’s reaction to President James Monroe’s veto of a 
major internal improvements bill, and the decision in Gibbons v. Og-
den—further undercut the aggressive nationalism interpretation of 
McCulloch. 
The significance of this revisionist examination of McCulloch goes 
beyond historical accuracy in the interpretation of a canonical text.  
In a brief Conclusion I suggest that the conventional misreading of 
McCulloch raises another set of questions concerning how and why the 
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aggressive nationalism thesis was created and became dominant in 
our constitutional law culture.13  Why is our constitutional law schol-
arship so committed to the idea that McCulloch helped build a nation, 
when the truth is that the decision did not even commit to building a 
road? 
I.  ASSESSING MCCULLOCH’S NATIONALISM 
The conventional view of McCulloch, which I call the “aggressive 
nationalism thesis,” maintains that McCulloch established an expansive 
view of national power in American constitutional law that invited or 
encouraged Congress to expand the national government’s role in 
American life.  But McCulloch makes several assertions of varying de-
grees of nationalism that modern commentators often view as an un-
differentiated mass.  A clear-headed assessment of Chief Jusice John 
Marshall’s nationalism requires us to distinguish doctrines that ex-
pansively interpret the regulatory powers of Congress from those that 
merely assert the power of the Supreme Court to control state courts’ 
interpretation of federal law or to block state regulation where the 
Constitution or a federal statute conflicts with state law. 
In this Part, I first identify the claims about McCulloch’s meaning 
that are characteristic of the aggressive nationalism thesis.  I then dis-
tinguish between two forms of nationalism:  one that matches the 
“aggressive” form attributed to McCulloch, and another that is better 
characterized as “defensive.”14  I argue that much of what is counted 
as Marshall’s nationalism in McCulloch is in fact defensive nationalism 
that fails to support the aggressive nationalism thesis.  To understand 
McCulloch on its own terms, we should identify with particularity what 
in McCulloch could properly be considered nationalist, and extract 
those elements that are properly considered aggressively nationalistic. 
 
 13 One general caveat is in order here.  It is conventional in constitutional and even legal 
history scholarship to treat the views of Chief Justice Marshall and those of the Marshall 
Court as interchangeable, at least in cases where Marshall authored the opinion.  This 
convention should perhaps give us pause—Marshall had four or five associate Justices 
who may have held varying views that Marshall had to accommodate, or at least to finesse, 
in any given opinion—perhaps accounting for some of the ambiguities we find in them.  
While undoubtedly a serious examination of the collective nature of Marshall Court deci-
sions would be illuminating, it is not clear to me that such an ambitious undertaking here 
would affect the arguments I make in this Article.  Thus, I have determined to embrace 
rather than resist the conventional equation of Marshall and his Court. 
 14 See HOBSON, supra note 12, at 123 (“[T]he nationalism endorsed by [McCulloch] is more 
accurately defined in negative or defensive terms—concerned primarily with preserving 
the union against powerful centrifugal tendencies that constantly threatened its dissolu-
tion.”). 
8 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
A.  The Conventional View:  McCulloch as “Aggressive Nationalism” 
The conventional wisdom maintains that McCulloch v. Maryland is 
an aggressively nationalistic decision.  Half a century after James 
Bradley Thayer’s paean to McCulloch, Justice Felix Frankfurter “fol-
low[ed] [Thayer] in believing that the conception of the nation 
which Marshall derived from the Constitution and set forth in 
M’Culloch v. Maryland is his greatest single judicial performance.”15  A 
few years later, Robert G. McCloskey famously opined that McCulloch 
is, “by almost any reckoning, the greatest decision John Marshall ever 
handed down.”16 
These mid-twentieth century views influenced successive genera-
tions of scholars, and persist to this day.  In the words of constitution-
al theorist Keith Whittington, McCulloch expressed a “sweeping na-
tionalist vision.”17  Legal historian Mark Killenbeck claims that 
“M’Culloch was also at the time and remains today an incredibly im-
portant holding on federal state relations . . . [that] became an essen-
tial foundation for much of what followed, in particular the extraor-
dinary expansion of federal authority that arose in the wake of [the 
New Deal].”18  As Michael Klarman has observed, “[t]wentieth-century 
advocates of expansive national power have insisted that Marshall’s 
capacious understandings of the Necessary and Proper Clause and 
the Commerce Clause were sufficient to accommodate the modern 
regulatory state.”19  Eminent historians of the antebellum period, 
probably influenced by their law colleagues, also see McCulloch as 
“what may have been the most important of his many important judi-
cial decisions,” in which Marshall “made great law.”20  McCulloch is 
presented as a “principal case” in every current constitutional law 
 
 15 Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 219 (1955).  
No serious study of McCulloch should fail to address the apostrophe question.  The official 
reports spelled the name “M’Culloch,” using an upside-down and backwards apostrophe, 
because that was how nineteenth century printers rendered a lower-case superscript “c,” 
which was itself an abbreviation for “Mc” or “Mac.”  Michael G. Collins, M’Culloch and the 
Turned Comma, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 265, 266 (2009).  The second “c” at the end of the name 
was a misspelling in the court records; apparently, the correct spelling of the party’s name 
was actually “McCulloh” (without the final “c”).  MARK R. KILLENBECK, M’CULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND:  SECURING A NATION 90 (2006). 
 16 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 66 (1960). 
 17 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 111 (2007). 
 18 KILLENBECK, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 19 Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1111, 1128 & n.82 (2001). 
 20 DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 
1815–1848, at 144–45 (2007). 
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casebook, usually introducing the topic of congressional power.21  As 
Gerard N. Magliocca has wryly observed, “Chief Justice Marshall cast 
such a powerful spell that M’Culloch has displaced the views of the 
Framers as the authoritative source on the scope of Congress’s pow-
er.”22 
The aggressive nationalism thesis lies at the heart of an ideology 
that regards Marshall as a “nation builder,” a George Washington, Al-
exander Hamilton, or Henry Clay of the judicial branch.  Constitu-
tional law literature is filled with such references.  Typical is Richard 
Fallon’s assertion that “the Court led by John Marshall successfully 
implemented a nation-building agenda that subsequent generations 
have widely applauded.”23  Such statements are typically left vague 
enough that their authors, if pressed, could retreat to a more modest 
and defensible claim that Marshall increased the prestige of the Su-
preme Court.  But the insistent use of the term nation builder is also 
vague enough to imply that from his Chief Justice’s seat, Marshall 
significantly contributed to the nation’s institutions beyond the Court 
itself, including even its territories or infrastructure.  It is in this con-
text that McCulloch is said to be Marshall’s signature nation-building 
achievement.24  Mainstream constitutional scholars thus seem to have 
 
 21 See, e.g., WILLAM C. BANKS & RODNEY A. SMOLLA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  STRUCTURE AND 
RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM 353, 355 (6th ed. 2010) (introducing chapter entitled 
“Federalism Limits on the Elected Branches and on the States”); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., 
CASES AND MAERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD 
CENTURY 879, 881 (5th ed. 2013) (introducing chapter entitled “Federalism:  Congres-
sional Power and State Authority”); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 60, 63 (16th ed. 2007) (introducing chapter entitled “The Nation 
and the States in the Federal System”).  McCulloch was included as a principal case in six-
teen out of sixteen law school constitutional law casebooks surveyed for this Article, and 
the case was used to introduce the chapter on federalism or congressional power in four-
teen of those.  The other two still cite McCulloch prominently.  See Research Memo on 
McCulloch in Casebooks (Jan. 9, 2015) (on file with author). 
 22 Magliocca, supra note 10, at 125. 
 23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose A Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 569 n.188 
(1999); accord R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 302 (2001) (stating that Marshall led the Court “to help Congress help the people 
help themselves build a nation”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES:  WHY EXTREME 
RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 35 (2005) (describing “Marshall as a na-
tion-building perfectionist”); Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 217 (“[Marshall] belongs 
among the main builders of our nation.”); Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (1997) (noting “the nation-building spirit of John Marshall”). 
 24 See, e.g., Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 217–19; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court:  
Congress As the Audience?, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 149 (2001) (“The 
nation-building, nationalizing impulses behind this Constitution were well expressed in 
McCulloch v. Maryland . . . .”); Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civ-
il War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1329 (2009) (noting that antebellum Supreme Court interpreta-
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an investment in McCulloch that goes beyond its supposed contribu-
tion to constitutional law.  Marshall, writes Kenneth Karst, “under-
stood that he was not just creating doctrine but building a nation.”25  
In such statements lies an implicit, unexamined claim about the ca-
pacity of courts to contribute directly to the creation of national cul-
ture, wealth, and power. 
A handful of historians of the Marshall Court have declined to go 
so far, and instead raise questions about an aggressive nationalist 
characterization of Marshall in general or McCulloch in particular.  
For example, William E. Nelson has argued Marshall was a “moderate 
judge” whose nationalism was “not . . . consistent.”26  Instead, Mar-
shall’s nationalism was tempered by an eighteenth century consensus-
oriented judicial approach, in which judges would decide questions 
of government power either “by appealing to widely shared values” 
or, where those were unavailable, by treating the questions as “politi-
cal” and deferring to legislative choices.27  Charles F. Hobson’s brief 
but perceptive analysis of McCulloch posits that “Marshall’s argument 
[did not] so much affirm a ‘broad’ (a term he did not use) construc-
tion of Congress’s powers as reject the restrictive construction adopt-
ed by Maryland’s counsel.”28  Thus, “[a]s an expression of national-
ism, . . . McCulloch is not to be understood as a prescient anticipation 
of the modern liberal state.”29  Other scholars have made general or 
passing remarks suggesting that McCulloch might have been more 
moderate than commonly supposed.30 
But such cautionary notes have not made a dent in the aggressive 
nationalism thesis, probably for two reasons.  First, given the deci-
sion’s supposed importance in constitutional law, there is strikingly 
little historical scholarship focusing in detail on McCulloch.  The two 
books by legal historians focusing on McCulloch are confirmatory of 
the aggressive nationalism thesis.31  Otherwise, treatments of McCul-
loch are limited to parts of book chapters or articles on Marshall or his 
“nationalism” decisions.  Second, several important historians either 
 
tions of the Constitution, including McCulloch, “contributed above all to the process of 
nation-building”). 
 25 KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:  EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 
198 (1989). 
 26 William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitutional Juris-
prudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 898, 933 (1978). 
 27 Id. at 901–02. 
 28 HOBSON, supra note 12, at 123. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See infra note 453 and accompanying text. 
 31 See generally ELLIS, supra note 6; KILLENBECK, supra note 15. 
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equivocate or backtrack from assertions that McCulloch was something 
less than aggressively nationalistic.  G. Edward White observes that 
Marshall’s was “not a nationalism in the modern sense of support for 
affirmative plenary federal regulatory power,” but “can more accu-
rately be described as a critique of reserved state sovereignty.”32  But 
he elsewhere reads McCulloch to “g[i]ve to the federal government 
unlimited discretionary power within the scope of its enumerated 
powers,” which makes “the significance of McCul-
loch . . . extraordinarily vast.”33  Gerald Gunther and Kent Newmyer 
have likewise argued that McCulloch did not embrace an extreme 
form of nationalism.34  But they both proceed to exaggerate McCul-
loch’s nationalistic impact on the crucial issue of Congress’s power 
over internal improvements.  Noting that the McCulloch decision car-
ried potentially far-reaching implications for internal improve-
ments—“McCulloch is the great case because it was a roads and canals 
case”35—Gunther argued, “[w]ith respect to the ongoing [internal 
improvements] debate, [McCulloch’s] rationale gave impetus, not 
mere approval” to Henry Clay’s American System package of nation-
alistic legislative proposals.36  Similarly, Newmyer reads McCulloch as 
laying the constitutional foundation for internal improvements, 
broadly asserting that “John Marshall’s America” was characterized by 
 
 32 3–4 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:  THE MARSHALL COURT 
AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 486 (1988). 
 33 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 30 (3d ed. 2007). The original 
book was published in the mid-1970s, id. at xxviii, but White has not changed this lan-
guage in the recent edition, despite having published a much more nuanced account of 
Marshall’s jurisprudence in the intervening years in the HOLMES DEVISE.  See supra text 
accompanying note 32. 
   To similar effect, compare Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 1009 (suggesting 
McCulloch’s importance as a nationalism case may have resulted from an historically retro-
fitted interpretation), with id. at 973 (arguing McCulloch “established an expansive view of 
national power under the U.S. Constitution”). 
 34 See Gerald Gunther, Introduction to JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND 1, 20 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (arguing that Marshall “did not view McCul-
loch as embracing extreme nationalism” and that he “opposed extreme formulations, ex-
cessively broad as well as unduly arrow, of the range of legitimate means”); R. Kent New-
myer, John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States’ Rights Tradition, 33 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 875, 877 (2000) (asserting that Marshall “is not only not consolidation-
ist (as his critics maintained) but is far more nuanced and more attentive to the needs 
and practices of state government than is generally recognized”). 
 35 Gunther, supra note 34, at 8; accord Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior?  Judicial 
Power, Political Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 119 
(2009) (asserting that the Marshall Court “pointedly inform[ed] James Monroe that the 
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland committed the Justices to sustaining all federally fund-
ed internal improvements”). 
 36 Gunther, supra note 34, at 7–8. 
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“[a] national market—integrated by an efficient system of roads and 
canals and later railroads, guarded from the invasion of foreign 
goods by protective tariffs, and enhanced by a uniform currency and 
a national system of credit.”37  But as I will argue below, McCulloch 
steered clear of all controversial aspects of the American System; 
while it did not affirmatively block, McCulloch gave neither impetus 
nor approval to such nationalist legislation.38 
Not even revisionist scholars are immune from the aggressive na-
tionalist reading of McCulloch.  For example, Michael Klarman in-
sightfully demonstrates that McCulloch did not have a great influence 
on subsequent antebellum constitutional questions; but he bases his 
argument in large part on the idea that Marshall was creating nation-
alist elbow room for a laggard Congress.39  According to Klarman, 
“[a]fter McCulloch, it was difficult to imagine a politically plausible 
congressional exercise of power that would exceed constitutional lim-
itations, at least so long as Congress did not ‘pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not intrusted to the [national] government’ on a 
‘pretext of executing its powers.’”40  Klarman argues in essence that 
Marshall was more nationalistic than Congress:  “nationalist decisions 
such as McCulloch and Gibbons” expressed “the Court’s broad invita-
tion [to Congress] to exercise national power.”41  Klarman’s revision-
ist argument about McCulloch’s historical influences thus embraces 
the aggressive nationalism interpretation of the case.42 
 
 37 NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 301–02; accord Newmyer, supra note 34, at 880 (asserting that 
McCulloch “overrode Madison’s arguments set forth in his veto of the Bonus Bill in 1816, 
which maintained that Congress could not authorize internal improvements without a 
constitutional amendment”). 
 38 See infra Part III (discussing the internal improvements legislation that was relevant at the 
time of the decision). 
 39 This echoes an earlier assertion by Gunther that McCulloch “was a message . . . to rally the 
sagging forces of nationalism and to combat the mounting constitutional self-doubts in 
Congress,” because “[t]he 1819 consensus regarding the desirability and legitimacy of a 
national bank did not carry over to other national programs.”  Gunther, supra note 34, at 
6. 
 40 Klarman, supra note 19, at 1126–27 (alterations in original) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819)); see also id. at 1155 (asserting that the Marshall Court “em-
braced broad conceptions of national power”); id. at 1160 (characterizing Marshall’s 
“conception of national government power” as “latitudinarian”). 
 41 Id. at 1144.  To be sure, Klarman makes this point in the course of arguing that the invita-
tions were ineffectual; but my point is that Klarman is mistaken in characterizing Marshall 
Court opinions as invitations.  See infra note 75 and accompanying text (noting that the 
nationalist theory in McCulloch did not “imply . . . an expansive interpretation of con-
gressional powers”). 
 42 Likewise, Howard Gillman argues, on the one hand and contrary to the received wisdom, 
that Marshall adopted a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause.  See Howard Gillman, 
More on the Origins of the Fuller Court’s Jurisprudence:  Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power 
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In sum, the power of the aggressive nationalism interpretation of 
McCulloch in our legal culture is so strong that it tends to dominate 
the views of legal historians and constitutional scholars alike. 
B.  Aggressive versus Defensive Nationalism 
Several scholars, including adherents of the aggressive national-
ism thesis, have distinguished between defensive and aggressive na-
tionalism within Marshall’s constitutional doctrines.43  In his 1936 lec-
tures on the Commerce Clause, Justice Frankfurter distinguished 
between “Marshall’s use of the commerce clause as an instrument of 
negation” and “the affirmative aspects of the commerce clause,” 
through which the government might act “as a directing agent of so-
cial and economic policies.”44  Justice Frankfurter did not discuss 
McCulloch in these Commerce Clause lectures, but his point neverthe-
less applies.  More recently, White concludes that Marshall’s “most 
nationalistic achievement” was his “erection of a theoretical justifica-
 
Over Commerce and Manufacturing in Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Law, 49 POL. RES. Q. 
415, 423–24 (1996).  Nevertheless, Gillman says that Marshall’s “commitment to Hamil-
tonian political economy motivated him actively to tease out of the Constitution its more 
nationalistic features.”  Id. at 419.  In fact, as will be seen, Marshall’s embrace of Hamilto-
nian political economy was partial and half-hearted.  See infra Part III (emphasizing the 
significance of what Marshall did not say in the McCulloch opinion when the nationalist 
arguments for internal improvements were obviously before him). 
   Mark Graber has built up an impressive body of work demonstrating that the nation-
alist principles attributed to Marshall Court decisions are alloyed by limitations and cagey 
political maneuvers, and had less impact on political and institutional developments than 
widely supposed.  See, e.g., Graber, supra note 35, at 119 (arguing that the Marshall Court 
“mitigated potential tensions with Jeffersonian officials by pulling punches when political 
antagonisms were perceived as too intense”); Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review:  
Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609, 610 (2003) [hereinafter Gra-
ber, Establishing Judicial Review] (asserting that Marbury did not establish federal judicial 
review); Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues:  Cohens v. Virginia and the Problem-
atic Establishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67, 67–68 (1995) [hereinafter 
Graber, Passive-Aggressive Virtues] (arguing that the Marshall Court announced significant 
constitutional principles only when decisional outcomes would not antagonize hostile po-
litical forces).  Graber does not focus in particular on McCulloch and does not observe 
that Marshall’s compulsion to avoid antagonizing hostile political forces caused him to 
state McCulloch’s principles themselves in moderate or cautious terms.  Instead, Graber 
takes at face value the questionable assertion that the Marshall Court viewed McCulloch as 
having “committed” the Court to sustaining internal improvements legislation.  Graber, 
supra note 35, at 119.  I attempt to refute that view in this Article.  See infra Part III. 
 43 See, e.g., HOBSON, supra note 12, at 123 (characterizing McCulloch’s nationalism as “nega-
tive or defensive”). 
 44 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 38–39 
(1937).  Note the restraint with which Frankfurter described both Marshall’s nationalism 
and its causal connection to modern doctrine:  Marshall “conveyed . . . attitudes” that 
“eventually” “yielded . . . support.”  Id. 
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tion for [the Court’s] own power to review actions of the states that 
potentially collided with the Constitution”45 rather than for “facili-
tat[ing] the development of national institutions or sustain[ing] reg-
ulatory policies” of the national government.46  Similarly, Newmyer 
argues that Marshall’s nationalism consisted largely of defending the 
Court from political and legal attacks by Virginia states 
rights/compact theorists who, Marshall rightly believed, “wanted to 
redirect the entire course of American constitutional history” because 
they “looked to the Articles of Confederation, not the Constitution, 
as the true republican constitution.”47  As Hobson sums up, Marshall’s 
“negative or defensive” nationalism was “concerned primarily with 
preserving the union against powerful centrifugal tendencies that 
constantly threatened its dissolution.”48 
Legal scholars generally agree that most of the Marshall Court’s 
great nationalism decisions are in the negative category.49  Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward,50 Sturges v. Crowninshield,51 and other Contracts 
Clause cases are in this category.  Marshall’s occasional dicta support-
ive of a dormant commerce clause is also in this category.52  These 
cases are nationalist, insofar as they assert the supremacy of the na-
tional Constitution over state law, but they do not expand the powers 
of the political branches of the Federal Government.  The same is 
true for a second, closely related category, involving the assertion of 
the Supreme Court’s appellate authority over state courts.  Cohens v. 
Virginia,53 and Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter’s Les-
see54 are important cases in this category, as are parts of McCulloch55 
 
 45 WHITE, supra note 32, at 594. 
 46 Id. at 486. 
 47 Newmyer, supra note 34, at 886. 
 48 HOBSON, supra note 12, at 123; see id. at 115 (“[Marshall’s] nationalist perspective in-
clined not forward to the nation state that emerged after the Civil War but backward to 
the 1787 idea of a government of the union whose objects were primarily . . . to preserve 
the union against external invasion and internal turbulence.”). 
 49 Professor White categorizes Marshall’s “sovereignty and union” cases as falling into the 
categories of “jurisdiction of the federal courts” and “limitations . . . on the sovereignty of 
the states.”  WHITE, supra note 32, at 485. 
 50 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 51 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
 52 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (noting the power to regu-
late interstate commerce “can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be 
placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant”); see also Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh 
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (“We do not think that the act empowering the 
Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place a dam, across the creek, can, under the cir-
cumstances of the case, be considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce 
in its dormant state or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”). 
 53 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 54 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
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and Osborn v. Bank of the United States.56  While these decisions rely on 
Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, their focus is on judicial rather 
than congressional power. 
McCulloch is not celebrated as a negative or judicial nationalism 
decision.  It is thus important not to let our assessment of McCulloch’s 
nationalism be unduly shaded by Marshall’s negative nationalism in 
this other class of cases.  To be sure, judicial review is inherently neg-
ative insofar as its direct impact stems from striking down laws, and 
rarely if ever affirmatively mandates legislative action.57  But while the 
Marshall Court could not have required the chartering of a national 
bank, or the building of a national road, it permitted the former and 
could have permitted the latter.  The aggressive nationalism thesis 
views McCulloch as a kind of constitutional pre-approval letter for na-
tionalist legislation of various kinds, including internal improve-
ments.58  Such permission is rightly understood as constituting af-
firmative nationalism. 
C.  Defensive Nationalism in McCulloch 
As is very familiar, the McCulloch opinion is divided into two main 
sections:  the first, determining that Congress has the constitutional 
power to incorporate the Bank of the United States; and the second, 
holding that the state of Maryland lacks the power to tax the Bank. 
Marshall’s argument in McCulloch proceeds roughly as follows.  
The constitutionality of the Bank has been settled by longstanding 
legislative practice and acceptance by the political branches.59  The 
Court’s analysis is in accord, and begins with the question of implied 
powers, because the power to incorporate a bank is not expressly 
 
 55 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) (“[B]y this tribunal 
alone can the decision be made.  On the Supreme Court of the United States has the 
constitution of our country devolved this important duty.”). 
 56 22 (9 Wheat.) U.S. 738 (1824). 
 57 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 17, at 43–44 (“Judicial review is more useful for hampering 
the expansion of government than for hampering the reduction of government, regard-
less of any policy disagreements between the Court and the elected branches.”). 
 58 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (characterizing the McCulloch decision as a 
commitment to sustaining all federally funded internal improvements). 
59 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401 (“The principle now contested was introduced at 
a very early period of our history, has been recognized by many successive legislatures, 
and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law 
of undoubted obligation.”); see also BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA:  
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 233 (1957) (describing Madison’s eventual 
waiver of the question of constitutionality “as being precluded . . . by repeated recogni-
tions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such an institution, in acts of the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial branches of the government”). 
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granted.60  Implied powers are not limited to those without which a 
granted power would be nugatory; rather, Congress must have discre-
tion to choose among any means convenient or well adapted to im-
plementing the granted power.61  Reading the Constitution in the 
narrower sense would undermine its adaptability to unforeseen crises 
in affairs and its ability to endure over time.62  The Necessary and 
Proper Clause is consistent with this view of implied powers, and was 
not intended by the Framers to narrow the granted powers, but to 
confirm the existence of implied powers.  The Bank is constitutional 
because “it is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument” in 
conducting the national government’s “fiscal operations.”63 
Having determined that the Bank is constitutional, Marshall con-
siders whether Maryland can tax it.  The question must be analyzed 
against the backdrop of federal supremacy, whose essence is to re-
move all obstacles to Federal Government action within its sphere.  
Taxation is a potential obstacle:  it is essentially a power to regulate 
and even destroy what is taxed, and it is a power limited only by the 
political wishes of its constituents.64  States’ sovereign power of taxa-
tion extends only to powers that can be conferred by the state’s con-
stituents, which does not include a power over the national govern-
ment.65  Therefore, states cannot tax operations of the general 
government, just as a part cannot control the whole.66 
In evaluating the aggressiveness of McCulloch’s nationalism, we 
should start by filtering out three sets of themes and issues whose na-
tionalism is best characterized as defensive—and therefore not truly 
supportive of the aggressive nationalism thesis.  First, McCulloch lays 
out Marshall’s famous discussion of nationalist versus compact theo-
ry.  Second, McCulloch discusses federal supremacy and holds that 
federal operations are immune from state taxation.  Third, McCulloch 
is noted for what we might call Marshall’s constitutionalism, a catchall 
that includes his various general statements about the nature of the 
Constitution and its interpretation. 
 
 60 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. 
 61 Id. at 407–08. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 422. 
 64 Id. at 431. 
 65 Id. at 428, 435. 
 66 Id. at 435–36. 
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1.  Nationalist versus Compact Theory 
Marshall begins the Court’s constitutional analysis by explicating 
what has become known as his nationalist theory of the United States 
Constitution, rejecting the so-called “compact theory.”  The govern-
ment of the United States “proceeds directly from the people” rather 
than from a compact of sovereign States.67  The people met in state 
conventions as a convenience but that did not make the state conven-
tions into the equivalent of sovereign state legislatures.68  On the con-
trary, the state legislatures assented to yielding the state’s sovereignty 
to the constitutional scheme by “impli[cation] in calling a Conven-
tion, and thus submitting that instrument to the people.”69  Marshall 
thus summarizes the argument from Federalist No. 37, that rather 
than reconstituting a league in which sovereign states yield bits of 
their sovereignty, the Constitution emanates directly from the people, 
thereby creating a government whose “powers are granted by them, 
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”70 
Marshall’s elaboration of nationalist theory and rejection of com-
pact theory was defensive in nature and motivation.  He raised the is-
sue because “counsel for the State of Maryland have deemed it of 
some importance, in the construction of the Constitution, to consider 
that instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the act of 
sovereign and independent States.”71  In fact, Maryland counsel Lu-
ther Martin’s oral argument to the Court was an extended anti-
federalist harangue, arguing that the Constitution, as a compact of 
 
 67 Id. at 403. 
 68 Id. at 403–04. 
 69 Id. at 404. 
 70 Id. at 404–05; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 227 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“The genius of republican liberty seems to demand . . . that all power should 
be derived from the people.”). 
 71 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.  Indeed, Marshall concedes that there is no tight 
logical connection between these theoretical arguments and implied powers:  “The gov-
ernment of the Union, then, (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case,) is, em-
phatically, and truly, a government of the people.”  Id. at 404–05 (emphasis added).  Nor 
do the supremacy of federal law and the immunity of federal instrumentalities from state 
taxation logically depend on a rejection of compact theory.  On the contrary, a union 
that was a compact of states could logically and naturally provide that the general gov-
ernment would be immune from state taxes and state control, and that its laws would 
trump those of an individual member.  On the other hand, the supremacy and taxation 
arguments are theoretically stronger on a representation basis.  It is not wholly unreason-
able to theorize that states forming a compact or “league” might be said to count upon 
one another to behave collegially, and that an implied remedy where collegiality breaks 
down is to withdraw from the compact.  Marshall’s representation theory operates on the 
basis of hard democratic accountability, rather than comity, and implies the lack of one 
state’s power to change its relation to the Union without the consent of all the people. 
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the states, had to be strictly construed, with a heavy presumption 
against implied powers.72  As Newmyer and other scholars have told 
us, Marshall was deeply concerned to contest these attacks on the 
Constitution from anti-federalist extremists.73 
But we have to be careful about over-attributing aggressive nation-
alism to Marshall as a spillover from the vehemence of his battles with 
anti-federalists.  There is a difference between pushing forward the 
front lines of congressional regulatory power, and putting down gue-
rilla uprisings far in the rear.  It is far from clear whether rabid anti-
federalist critics in 1819 posed a significant threat to national institu-
tions, Marshall’s anxieties notwithstanding.74  Such arguments would 
re-emerge, but much later:  nullification, not to say secession, was 
more than a decade away. 
More to the point, while the nationalist theory in McCulloch might 
well have rebutted a compact-theory-based argument for strict con-
struction, it did not necessarily imply the opposite—an expansive in-
terpretation of congressional powers.75  To see the distinction be-
tween strong unionism and a belief in expansive national power, one 
need look no farther than the presidency of Andrew Jackson.  His de-
cisive reaction to put down the South Carolina nullifiers during the 
1832–1833 nullification crisis was strongly unionist, yet he was an 
iconic advocate of limited national legislative power. 
 
 72 WHITE, supra note 32, at 238–39.  This was not the first nor the last time Marshall would 
hear this argument—it would be flung against McCulloch in the Amphictyon and Hamp-
den newspaper essays in the spring and summer of 1819 and urged on the Court again in 
Gibbons v. Ogden.  For a collection of these essays and Marshall’s defense, see JOHN 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinaf-
ter MARSHALL'S DEFENSE]. 
 73 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (explaining that Marshall’s nationalism was 
against external threats and internal turbulence); see, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN 
MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 145 (1919) (explaining that Marshall saw himself as 
the “official custodian” of nationalist constitutional principles “in face of the rising tide of 
State Rights”). 
 74 According to Sean Wilentz, Marshall critics such as John Taylor of Caroline, represented 
“a voice from the past, reflecting the deepening anxieties of the old Chesapeake Tidewat-
er planter elite.”  SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  JEFFERSON TO 
LINCOLN 214 (2005). 
 75 See WHITE, supra note 32, at 486 (arguing that the kind of “nationalism” present did not 
include “support for affirmative plenary federal regulatory power.”); Newmyer, supra note 
34, at 898–901 (noting that the McCulloch decision left “an extensive body of promotive 
and regulatory economic legislation” “largely untouched”). 
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2.  Taxation and Supremacy 
Many exponents of the aggressive nationalism thesis claim to draw 
support from Marshall’s taxation and supremacy arguments.76  But 
these elements of McCulloch are not what have inspired subsequent 
generations to canonize the case as having “set forth” a “conception 
of the nation,” in Justice Frankfurter’s words.77  Simply put, we do not 
celebrate McCulloch either as “the Great Intergovernmental Tax Im-
munity case,” or as “the First Great Preemption Case.”  Undoubtedly, 
these points are doctrinally important,78 and they provide plenty of 
nationalist atmospherics.  But they represent quintessentially defen-
sive nationalism, protecting the operation of federal laws and instru-
mentalities from state interference. 
After rejecting compact theory, Marshall’s opinion introduces 
“the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to 
Congress.79  In the paragraph immediately following, Marshall grand-
ly asserts that “[i]n discussing these questions, the conflicting powers 
of the general and State governments must be brought into view, and 
the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition, 
must be settled.”80  He then elaborates the supremacy principle.  The 
United States government 
[i]s the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents 
all, and acts for all.  Though any one State may be willing to control its 
operations, no State is willing to allow others to control them.  The na-
tion, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its com-
ponent parts.81 
The supremacy principle “is not left to mere reason:  the people 
have, in express terms, decided it,” by including the Supremacy 
Clause in the Constitution.82 Having established this point, Marshall 
begins his extended discussion of implied powers. 
 
 76 See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 73, at 144–45 (espousing the supremacy of national power 
over state power). 
 77 Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 219. 
 78 See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 US 141, 160 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the preemption doctrine is “the true test of federalis[m] principle[s]”); Garrick B. Purs-
ley, Preemption in Congress, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 511, 513 (2010) (“[P]reemption may be the 
most important issue for modern federalism theory . . . .”). 
 79 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id.; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
14–15 (1969) (“Marshall’s reasoning . . . is, as I read it, essentially structural.  It has to do 
in great part with what he conceives to be the warranted relational properties between 
the national government and the government of the states, with the structural corollaries 
of national supremacy—and, at some point, of the mode of formation of the Union.”). 
 82 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405–06. 
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This juxtaposition of the supremacy principle and implied powers 
might create the (mis)impression that affirming the supremacy of na-
tional laws is the same as broadening the reach of national legislative 
jurisdiction.  But the two are plainly not the same:  one could hold 
strict constructionist views about the breadth of national power while 
still maintaining that national laws, within their narrow sphere, are 
supreme.  Again, Andrew Jackson’s position during the nullification 
crisis illustrates this point.  Marshall makes the same point in McCul-
loch’s first Supremacy Clause passage by twice asserting “that the gov-
ernment of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme with-
in its sphere of action.”83 
Once he turns to the discussion of implied powers just after this, 
Marshall puts the question of supremacy aside, picking up the su-
premacy thread again only in part II of the opinion, when discussing 
whether Maryland can tax the Bank.  And the entire thrust of this 
part of the opinion is not to assert a principle expanding national 
power, but rather of preserving it from control and obstruction by 
the states.  Marshall argues that “[i]t is of the very essence of suprem-
acy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so 
to modify every power vested in subordinate governments, as to ex-
empt its own operations from their influence.”84  The operations and 
instrumentalities of the national government are the act of the whole 
people, subject to the control of the whole people.85  For a state to 
control national operations or instrumentalities violates the funda-
mental principle of democratic representation:  it is the assertion by 
the people of one state of a right to control the people outside their 
state.86  Since taxation is a sovereign regulatory power, an incident of 
control, state taxation of a federal instrumentality is subject to the 
same principle.87  When Marshall says “the power to tax involves the 
power to destroy,” he means two things that sometimes get lost in the 
aphoristic smoke of that pithy phrase.88  First, taxation is a form of 
control.  Second, as a general matter, there is no constitutional check 
on the degree of taxation other than accountability to the electorate.  
“[W]hen a State taxes the operations of the government of the Unit-
ed States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constitu-
 
 83 Id. at 405; accord id. at 406. 
 84 Id. at 427. 
 85 Id. at 435–36. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 431. 
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ents, but by people over whom they claim no control.”89  The struc-
ture of the Constitution is largely designed to prohibit this sort of 
state opportunism and (in modern economic terms) cost externaliza-
tion onto other states.  In sum, Marshall’s supremacy and taxation 
discussion aims fixedly on defending the constitutional union from 
attack by self-interested states. 
The taxation and supremacy discussions fail to make McCulloch 
the great case in large part because these principles were defensively, 
rather than aggressively, nationalistic.  Furthermore, and related, the-
se points were unremarkable and unexceptionable.  As William Nel-
son puts it, these discussions were “not [the] ‘broad constitutional 
views’ of an ‘ardent nationalist’” because “[t]he Supremacy 
Clause . . . mandated the supremacy of federal law over conflicting 
state law . . . as clearly as any legal text requires a specific result.”90  
Nor were Marshall’s views on federal supremacy and immunity from 
state taxation seriously contested outside the courtroom.  After the 
decision was issued leading critics of McCulloch’s nationalist constitu-
tional theory and implied powers analysis agreed with Marshall’s taxa-
tion and supremacy analyses, expressly conceding that the Bank, if 
constitutional, could not be taxed by Maryland.91  In later years, the 
Taney Court treated McCulloch as authoritative on the taxation point, 
even as it ignored McCulloch’s implied powers holding.92  And while 
the Taney Court did not cite McCulloch on supremacy, its Supremacy 
Clause rulings were as aggressive, if not more so, than McCulloch.93  In 
other words, Marshall’s nationalism on the tax and supremacy issues 
merely articulated an existing constitutional consensus acceptable to 
Republicans in 1819 and mainstream Jacksonians up to the secession 
crisis.  These holdings thus provide exceedingly thin justification for 
the aggressive nationalism interpretation of McCulloch. 
 
 89 Id. at 435. 
 90 See Nelson, supra note 26, at 896 (citations omitted). 
 91 A Virginian’s ‘Amphictyon’ Essays, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, April 2, 1819, reprinted in 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 72, at 76. 
 92 See New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Comm’rs of Taxes, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 620, 632–
33 (1863) (applying McCulloch to strike down state tax on federal bonds); Dobbins v. 
Comm’rs of Erie Cnty. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435, 449 (1842) (applying McCulloch to strike 
down state tax on federal revenue officer).  For an argument that the Taney Court, led by 
Chief Justice Roger Taney, would have overruled McCulloch on the Bank and implied 
power issues had the opportunity arisen, see Magliocca, supra note 10, at 133. 
 93 See, e.g., Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (12 How.) 506, 517–18 (1859) (holding that that Su-
premacy Clause does not allow the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 673–74 (1842) (holding that Penn-
sylvania’s law prohibiting the extradition of blacks violated the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 
as applied by the Supremacy Clause). 
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3.  Constitutional Interpretation 
McCulloch is filled with phrases and passages, including many fa-
vorites, that create at least an atmosphere consistent with the aggres-
sive nationalism interpretation.  The most important and best known 
of these are:  “it is a constitution we are expounding”94 and “a consti-
tution intended to endure for ages to come.”95  Justice Frankfurter 
called the first quote “the single most important utterance in the lit-
erature of constitutional law—most important because most compre-
hensive and comprehending.”96  Edward Corwin crystallized the se-
cond point into one of the six “tenets of nationalism” bestowed on 
posterity by Marshall.97  The first passage tells us that the existence of 
implied powers is the necessary implication of a constitution, which 
cannot specify the legislative means, such as bank charters, that may 
be used to promote its larger purposes.  The second passage tells us 
that the phrase “necessary and proper” confirms, and does not re-
strict the general existence of implied powers; moreover, the idea of 
implied powers itself implies a breadth of legislative discretion over 
the choice of means so that the Constitution can endure over time 
and through unforeseen crises. 
 
 94 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis omitted).  The full passage states: 
There is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, ex-
cludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that every thing granted 
shall be expressly and minutely described . . . .  A constitution, to contain an accu-
rate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the 
means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity 
of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.  It would 
probably never be understood by the public.  Its nature, therefore, requires, that 
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the 
minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of 
the objects themselves.  That this idea was entertained by the framers of the Amer-
ican constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but 
from the language.  Why else were some of the limitations, found in the ninth sec-
tion of the 1st article, introduced?  It is also, in some degree, warranted by their 
having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair 
and just interpretation.  In considering this question, then, we must never forget, 
that it is a constitution we are expounding. 
  Id. at 406–07. 
 95 Id. at 415.  The full passage reads: 
   This could not be done by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as not 
to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and 
which were conducive to the end.  This provision is made in a constitution intended 
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs.  To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all fu-
ture time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of 
the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. 
 Id. 
 96 Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 219. 
 97 CORWIN, supra note 73, at 144–45. 
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Thus, despite the grandeur of Marshall’s phrasing, we have to 
keep our heads and remember that Marshall is making a fairly specif-
ic point:  implied powers exist, giving Congress discretion to choose 
among a wide range of means to execute the government’s enumer-
ated powers.98  This tells us that Marshall’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation is only as nationalistic as the implied powers doctrine it 
supports. 
D.  McCulloch’s “Aggressive” Nationalism 
The several above-discussed features of McCulloch that are taken as 
demonstrating Marshall’s nationalism do not succeed in proving his 
“aggressive nationalism”—a broad assertion of the scope of federal 
power.  Marshall’s assertion of federal supremacy and tax immunity 
were a straightforward application of the Supremacy Clause, and not 
notably aggressive.  His theoretical rejection of compact theory in fa-
vor of nationalist constitutional theory, together with his rejection of 
a general principle of narrow construction of federal powers, were 
refutations of extreme antifederalist positions that did not necessarily 
imply far-reaching nationalist ones.  And Marshall’s broad abstrac-
tions about constitutional interpretation likewise beg the question of 
whether or how much to construe congressional powers expansively. 
Thus, the true test of McCulloch’s “aggressive” nationalism calls on 
us to focus on the doctrine of implied powers and their relationship 
to enumerated powers.  Does giving wide latitude to implied powers 
expand the powers of Congress if the enumerated powers are not 
construed broadly?  If not, does McCulloch’s articulation of the doc-
trine of implied powers, its application to the specific question of the 
Bank, or any supporting dicta in the opinion, generate an expansive 
interpretation of any enumerated power?  In examining those ques-
tions, we should ask whether McCulloch affirmatively demonstrates, in 
Gillman’s words, “a commitment to Hamiltonian political econo-
my.”99  Did it affirmatively promote, as Newmyer asserts, a national 
market or a national power to control the currency and the money 
supply?100  Did McCulloch, as Gunther claims, “g[i]ve impetus, not 
mere approval” to internal improvements legislation, and was “McCul-
 
 98 Cf. HOBSON, supra note 12, at 119 (“By this remark, [Marshall] meant only that the Con-
stitution should not be read as a detailed blueprint for governing; it did not signify ap-
proval of the idea of an evolving Constitution.”). 
 99 Gillman, supra note 42, at 419 n.4. 
100 NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 301–02. 
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loch . . . the great case because it was a roads and canals case”?101  In 
other words, does McCulloch support a congressional power to build a 
road? 
II.  MCCULLOCH’S CONTEXT:  THE BANK CONTROVERSY AND THE 
MONEY SUPPLY 
The decision to uphold the Bank’s constitutionality would not 
have seemed aggressively nationalistic in Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
day.  “To assert in 1819 that Congress had the power to establish a na-
tional bank was to validate an existing consensus, not to break new 
ground.”102  The opportunity presented to make nationalist doctrine 
would largely consist in how the Court justified the Bank’s constitu-
tionality—by construing one or more congressional powers broadly. 
The McCulloch decision was one episode in a long-running contro-
versy over a national bank that began in 1790 and continued long af-
ter McCulloch was decided in 1819.103  Nearly thirty years of debates 
over a national bank preceding McCulloch created a rich record of 
factual, policy, and constitutional arguments that supported not only 
the Bank’s constitutionality, but also potentially broad interpretations 
of several congressional powers.  The history further demonstrates 
that one did not need to have the intellect of the great federalist mas-
termind Hamilton to appreciate the arguments:  they were widely 
available and intellectually accessible in 1791, let alone 1819.  Mar-
shall was well aware of this history, having studied the 1790–1791 
documents in preparing his biography of George Washington.  And 
 
101 Gunther, supra note 34, at 7–8.  Cf. WHITE, supra note 32, at 542 (asserting that contem-
porary observers viewed McCulloch as “especially important” because they “regarded it as a 
kind of advisory opinion for two other issues of even greater potential importance, the 
constitutionality of federally sponsored internal improvements projects and the constitu-
tionality of federal slavery legislation”). 
102 Gunther, supra note 34, at 4; accord HOBSON, supra note 12, at 117 (“Under the circum-
stances, a holding that Congress had no authority to charter a bank would have been ex-
traordinary.”); HOWE, supra note 20, at 145 (arguing that “the constitutionality of the 
Bank did not in itself surprise observers, since the Republican Party had come around to 
endorsing it in 1816”); Klarman, supra note 19, at 1128–29, 1160 (arguing that McCul-
loch’s “holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowered Congress to charter a 
bank was quite unexceptionable in 1819”); see also text accompanying notes 180–85 (de-
tailing Jeffersonian Republican support for a second bank). 
103 The history of the National Bank was itself an element in a larger constitutional struggle 
over the question of federal control over national currency and monetary policy.  Other 
major episodes included President Andrew Jackson’s Bank Veto; the 1862 National Bank 
Act; the Legal Tender Cases of 1870, 1871, and 1884; the Federal Reserve Act of 1913; and 
the 1934 Gold Clause Cases.  The fundamental questions of congressional control were not 
fully settled for 150 years after the founding of the republic.  See generally JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774–1970 (1973). 
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any more recently developed constitutional arguments were ably pre-
sented to him at the McCulloch oral argument. 
It is therefore striking that, as we shall see, Marshall disregarded 
virtually all of the arguments available to him for upholding the Se-
cond Bank on a broad ground.  In particular, Marshall declined to 
address arguments that the national government had an implied 
power to impose a uniform national currency, and that control over 
the currency by a central bank would facilitate interstate commerce.  
The McCulloch opinion refrains from giving a broad interpretation to 
any identifiable enumerated power. 
A.  Constitutional Foundations 
McCulloch is a famous case in large part because the U.S. Constitu-
tion does not expressly grant Congress the power to charter a bank.  
But McCulloch tells us precious little about the degree to which the 
Constitution does expressly deal with national authority over monetary 
and financial issues that go to the heart of banking.  The American 
economy under the Articles of Confederation was, according to fi-
nancial historian Bray Hammond, a whole that “was weaker than its 
parts, which followed their thirteen, sovereign, jealous, and selfish 
courses to the rapid deterioration of common interests.”104  Com-
merce was hampered both by discriminatory taxation and the lack of 
a uniform currency.105  Merchants in states lacking ports for foreign 
commerce had to pay tribute to those that did, through which their 
foreign imports had to pass.106  As President James Madison put it, 
“New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was likened 
to a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between Virginia 
and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms.”107  Further, 
each state had its own monetary system and resident-friendly laws:  
“[a] merchant in Massachusetts or Connecticut, for example, was 
helpless in collecting amounts due him from Rhode Island, because 
Rhode Island money though depreciated was legal tender, and 
Rhode Island in her courts and laws sought to protect her citizens 
from oppression by ‘foreigners.’”108  Though this state of affairs was of 
far greater concern to merchants than to the self-sufficient agrarians 
who composed the majority of the population, delegates at the Con-
 
104 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 89. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 90. 
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stitutional Convention placed a high priority on addressing commer-
cial issues in the new Constitution:  “[i]t was the plight of commerce 
that thrust the reluctant states into a more perfect union.”109 
To address these problems, the new Constitution prohibited states 
from laying tonnage duties and from using import and export taxes 
as a source of revenue,110 as well as generally authorizing Congress to 
regulate foreign and interstate commerce.111  Beyond these clauses 
are several provisions dealing with finance.  Congress was authorized 
to coin money and regulate its value; to punish counterfeiting; and to 
borrow money on the credit of the government.112  States were for-
bidden to “coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; [or] make any Thing but 
gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.”113  The grant of 
congressional power to determine the value of coin, which implicitly 
denied that power to the states, was a continuation of policy estab-
lished under the Articles of Confederation.114  But the other prohibi-
tions on state issues of money, either as coin, paper or negotiable 
debt instruments, were new.  Taking these clauses together, accord-
ing to Willard Hurst, “[t]he clearest policy set in the federal Constitu-
tion showed strong distrust of allowing state legislatures to set money-
supply policy . . . [and] determined that ultimate control of the mon-
ey supply should be a matter of national policy.”115 
These provisions left certain matters ambiguous.  While states 
were clearly prohibited from issuing money from their own treasuries 
or mints, or from recognizing banknotes of state chartered banks as 
legal tender for private debts,116 the affirmative money powers of 
Congress were not fully specified.  Could Congress issue paper mon-
ey?  And if so, could it make that paper money legal tender?  The lat-
ter question would not be fully resolved for a century.  But the power 
to issue paper money seemed to be implied:  the express prohibition 
on state bills of credit combined with an absence of a like prohibition 
on Congress, an affirmative authorization to borrow money, and an 
 
109 Id. at 91. 
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting tonnage duties); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 
(limiting import and export duties to only cover the cost of inspection of the goods, with 
any overage payable to the national treasury). 
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
112 Id. 
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
114 HURST, supra note 103, at 8. 
115 Id. 
116 The Supreme Court eventually recognized that states’ sovereign powers authorized them 
to accept payment of state taxes in whatever form of money—or for that matter in kind—
they chose.  Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 77 (1868). 
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implied authorization to issue “securities” (in the counterfeiting 
clause)117 all suggest that Congress was authorized to put treasury 
notes into circulation as currency. 
B.  The First Bank and Hamiltonian Political Economy 
Historically minded exponents of the aggressive nationalism thesis 
suggest that Marshall used the McCulloch case as an opportunity to 
embrace “Hamiltonian political economy.”  To be sure, Marshall’s 
opinion relied heavily on the constitutional history of the First Bank 
of the United States (1791–1811).  “An exposition of the constitution, 
deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an 
immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly disre-
garded,” Marshall wrote.118  He went on to allude to the debates over 
the Bank’s constitutionality: 
After being resisted, first in the fair and open field of debate, and after-
wards in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any 
measure has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which 
convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it 
became a law.119 
The history and debates surrounding the First Bank are important 
because they illustrate the constitutional underpinnings of Hamilto-
nian political economy, arguments that were well known to Marshall.  
We can then examine to what extent these arguments found their 
way into the McCulloch opinion. 
1.  Hamilton’s Bank Report 
Alexander Hamilton, the nation’s first Secretary of the Treasury, 
set out to address these issues by offering the First Congress a com-
prehensive set of proposals to rationalize the nation’s finances and 
promote domestic industry.  After the First Congress passed a bill 
adopting the recommendations in Hamilton’s First Report on the Public 
Credit to assume and refinance state revolutionary war debts, on De-
cember 14, 1790, it received Hamilton’s Second Report on the Further 
Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit, also known as the Report 
on a National Bank (“Bank Report”).120 
 
117 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (granting Congress the power to punish counterfeiting 
“the Securities and current Coin of the United States”). 
118 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
119 Id. at 402. 
120 7 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Final Version of the Second Report on the Further Provision Necessary 
for Establishing Public Credit (Report on a National Bank), Dec. 13, 1790, reprinted in THE 
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Though a policy paper in nature and intent, the Bank Report is 
highly relevant to the underlying constitutional question.  Arguments 
about implied powers are grounded in the factual and policy ques-
tions about how closely and well a proposed policy serves to execute a 
power expressly granted in the Constitution.  In his Bank Report, 
Hamilton’s policy arguments implicated several enumerated powers 
from which a constitutional power to charter a national bank could 
be implied. 
Hamilton began by arguing that a national bank would be of ser-
vice “not only in relation to the administration of the finances, but in 
the general system of the political economy.”121  On the administra-
tive side, a national bank would be able to give “pecuniary aids” to the 
government “especially in sudden emergencies” because they collect 
private capital and command credit far in excess of what is in their 
vaults.122  Further, a national bank would facilitate the payment of 
taxes:  taxpayers can get loans to pay taxes, but more importantly, the 
Bank’s notes increase the quantity of (nationally uniform) circulating 
medium in which to pay taxes.123  Without a national bank, “if there 
happen to be no private bills, at market, and there are no Bank notes, 
which have a currency in both . . . coin must be remitted.”124  Banks 
are also convenient instruments for the payment of public debts “at 
thirteen different places.”125  Without bank-issued paper money, gov-
ernment payment of debts would require transporting gold and silver 
around the country to government creditors, with the result that “a 
considerable proportion of the specie of the country must always be 
suspended from circulation” as it is transported, at great risk, from 
place to place.126  Banks can replace this cumbersome process with 
easily conveyed paper banknotes or even deposit credits.127 
Additionally, as financial historian Bray Hammond summed up, 
Hamilton wanted to make the Bank “as powerful a credit agency as 
possible in the new American economy” to promote the nation’s for-
eign and domestic commerce.128  In general, Hamilton argued, banks 
 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 305, 350 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 
1963); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 78 (1997) (discussing Hamilton’s report). 
121 7 HAMILTON, supra note 120, at 319. 
122 Id. at 309. 
123 Id. at 309–10. 
124 Id. at 310. 
125 Id. at 322. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 322–23. 
128 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 139. 
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expand the money supply far in excess of “the actual quantum of 
their capital in Gold & Silver” by circulating money equivalents in the 
form of banknotes or credits against depositor’s accounts.129  Bank-
notes are redeemable in gold and silver specie, but due to the con-
venience of paper, the notes “are indefinitely suspended in circula-
tion, from the confidence which each holder has, that he can at any 
moment turn them into gold and silver.”130  Likewise deposit credits 
shift from bank to bank without note holders or depositors seeking to 
withdraw specie.131  Banks in this way “increase the active capital of a 
country” and thus “contribut[e] to enlarge the mass of industrious 
and commercial enterprise,” thereby becoming “nurseries of national 
wealth.”132 
A national bank was also useful commercially to control the mon-
ey supply.  Hamilton was aware that strict reliance on specie as cur-
rency could cause severe liquidity crises, dragging down commercial 
transactions and also creating extreme difficulties to the government 
in collection of taxes.133  Chronic undersupply of specie always creates 
pressure for paper money to come from somewhere, and fiscal crises 
put pressure on the government to print money.  While the Constitu-
tion prohibited states, but not the Federal Government, from “paper 
emissions,” government issuance of paper money is always “liable to 
abuse.”134  Banks offer an advantage over government as a source of 
paper money:  they will limit their issuance of notes to some fixed ra-
tio of their gold and silver reserves, whereas the government is lim-
ited by mere good judgment, which will be hard pressed by the needs 
of the moment.135 
Finally, Hamilton demonstrated the utility of relying on a privately 
chartered corporation instead of trying to conduct these functions 
directly through the U.S. Treasury.  According to Hamilton, the Bank 
should be an essentially private, for-profit institution, for two related 
reasons.  First, government could not be trusted to avoid overdrawing 
a public bank’s resources to address “the temptations of momentary 
exigencies.”136  Second, the confidence required for the Banks’ notes 
 
129 7 HAMILTON, supra note 120, at 307. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 308–09. 
133 Id. at 314–15. 
134 Id. at 321. 
135 Id. at 322. 
136 Id. at 331.  This does not mean that the government cannot hold part of the Bank’s stock, 
only that the majority of shareholders and the Bank’s direction should be private.  Id. at 
333. 
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and credit to circulate without excessive demands for redemption in 
specie required that the Bank be directed “under the guidance of in-
dividual interest, not of public policy.”137  This would also mean both 
that profits would have to return to the Bank’s stockholders, and not 
go directly into the Treasury. 
A Senate committee adopted Hamilton’s recommendations and 
reported out a bill to incorporate a Bank of the United States.138  The 
proposal was immediately controversial.  In the debates in the House, 
Hamilton’s policy arguments were reframed in constitutional terms.  
Representatives Fisher Ames, Elbridge Gerry and Theodore Sedgwick 
of Massachusetts, and Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, took the lead for 
the Bank supporters.139  They readily acknowledged that incorporat-
ing a bank was a matter of powers implied from those enumerated.140  
Sedgwick argued that “the constitution had expressly declared the 
ends of Legislation; but in almost every instance had left the means to 
the sober and honest discretion of the Legislature.”141  Ames pointed 
to established congressional precedent for legislating on implied 
powers:  from its first session, Congress had passed acts to build and 
operate lighthouses, tax ships, and regulate merchant seaman based 
on the idea that authority was implied by the commerce power.142  
The power to charter a bank was implicit in the commerce, war, and 
borrowing powers, as well as the power to pay the debts of the United 
States.  Commerce, he argued, is facilitated by banknotes, paying 
debts by more easily transferring money around the country, and 
borrowing large sums to wage war or finance other government 
needs was greatly facilitated by a national bank.143  Sedgwick added 
that Madison, a leader of the opposition to the Bank charter, had en-
dorsed the idea of implied powers when advocating for the Presi-
dent’s power to remove officers.144 
Opponents, led by then-Congressman James Madison in the 
House, argued that the Constitution did not grant, and thus implicit-
 
137 Id. at 331 (alterations omitted).  Marshall at least dimly understood this idea, because in 
Osborn, he insisted (rightly) that the Second Bank’s ability to service the government’s fis-
cal needs depended on its conducting ordinary, private banking operations that would 
give it commercial self-sufficiency.  Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 (9 Wheat.) U.S. 738, 
766–67 (1824). 
138 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 114–15. 
139 CURRIE, supra note 120, at 78–79. 
140 Id. at 79. 
141 Id. at 79 n.193 (quoting 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1962 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick)). 
142 Id. at 79. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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ly withheld, authority from the national government to charter banks 
or any other corporations; and a national bank whose branches in 
various states would compete with state banks, would interfere with 
the rights of states to establish, or for that matter to prohibit, banks.145  
(There were only four state banks in the country in 1791, but there 
would be twenty-nine by 1800.146)  And of course, they argued for 
strict construction of implied powers as limited to those means “strict-
ly necessary” to the various enumerated powers:  since state banks 
could fulfill the national government’s banking needs, a national 
bank was not strictly necessary.147 
The Senate passed the bill on January 20, 1791 and on February 8, 
the House passed the bill by a wide margin, 39 to 20, with most sup-
port coming from Northern States and most opposition from South-
ern States.148  The bill was submitted to President Washington, who 
took his full allotment of time to consider it, asking his Secretary of 
State Thomas Jefferson and his Attorney General Edmund Randolph 
to write opinions on its constitutionality.149  Both argued that the 
Bank Bill was unconstitutional and urged Washington to veto it.150  
Washington then referred the matter to Hamilton for a response.151 
2.  Hamilton’s Opinion on Constitutionality 
With only a few days to go before Washington’s reply to Congress 
was required by the Constitution’s Presentment Clause, Hamilton 
produced a memorandum responding point by point to the written 
opinions of Randolph and Jefferson.  Like Marshall thirty years later, 
Hamilton was well aware that, notwithstanding the “great importance 
of [the Bank] to the successful administration of” the U.S. Treasury, 
“the chief solicitude arises from a firm persuasion, that principles of 
[constitutional] construction like those espoused [by Jefferson and 
Randolph] would be fatal to the just & indispensible authority of the 
 
145 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 115.  Opponents also made non-constitutional arguments, to 
the effect that banks favored mercantile over agrarian interests and bred corruption.  Id. 
at 116.  On the corruption issue, it is noteworthy that thirty members of Congress were 
among the Bank’s subscribers (initial stock purchasers).  Id. at 123.  While historically 
important, these arguments are tangential to the arguments in this Article. 
146 Id. at 128, 144–45. 
147 CURRIE, supra note 120, at 79–80. 
148 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 116–17. 
149 Id. at 117. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 117–18. 
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United States.”152  Like Marshall, Hamilton also argued from legisla-
tive precedent.  But whereas Marshall had the legislative precedent of 
the First Bank to argue from, Hamilton had to analogize to other ex-
ercises of implied powers to make a broader point against Jefferson’s 
restrictive rule of construction: 
Of this the act concerning light houses, beacons, buoys & public piers, is 
a decisive example.  This doubtless must be referred to the power of reg-
ulating trade, and is fairly relative to it.  But it cannot be affirmed, that 
the exercise of that power, in this instance, was strictly necessary; or that 
the power itself would be nugatory without that of regulating establish-
ments of this nature.153 
In other words, the Commerce Clause implied a power to build and 
deploy navigation aids, even though such things were not strictly nec-
essary to regulating interstate and foreign commerce.  But Hamilton 
went beyond implied powers to argue for a broad approach to enu-
merated powers.  The Commerce Clause precedent illustrated the 
“sound maxim of construction . . . that the powers contained in a 
constitution of government, especially those which concern the gen-
eral administration of the affairs of a country, its finances, trade, de-
fence [etc.] ought to be construed liberally, in advancement of the 
public good.”154  Randolph had argued that strict construction of the 
federal Constitution was warranted because there was more danger of 
error in interpreting limited grants of power than in implying general 
powers from state constitutions.155  But, Hamilton argued, “public ex-
igencies” at the national level are more likely to be “of a far more crit-
ical kind.”156  The dangers of liberal interpretation may warrant “cau-
tion in practice,” but a general rule of strict construction “would at 
once arrest the motions of the government.”157 
Addressing the specific question, Hamilton asserted that a nation-
al bank has an “immediate” relation to the powers to collect taxes and 
borrow money; a “more or less direct” relation to the powers “of regu-
lating trade between the states” and “supporting and maintaining 
fleets and armies”; and fell “clearly, within” the authority to make “all 
needful rules and regulations concerning the property of the United 
 
152 8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Es-
tablish a Bank, Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in HAMILTON PAPERS 97 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob 
E. Cooke eds., 1965). 
153 Id. at 104 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
154 Id. at 105 (emphasis added). 
155 Id. at 105 & n.12. 
156 Id. at 105. 
157 Id. at 105–06. 
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States.”158  A bank relates to the collection of taxes by “increasing” and 
“quickening” the circulation of currency, and by facilitating the pay-
ment of taxes with a convenient medium of payment—paper money, 
rather than only specie.159  The government has the right to deter-
mine the form of money it will accept in payment, including, for in-
stance, Treasury bills.160  Since the government could issue its own to-
kens of credit to use in payment of taxes, why could it not create a 
bank to do so? 161 
Hamilton argued that foreseeable crises involving the taxation, 
borrowing, and war powers might be difficult or impossible to solve 
without a bank.  Should economic conditions produce a drain of spe-
cie from the nation, the collection of taxes would be extremely diffi-
cult, and some sort of paper medium would have to be substituted for 
gold or silver.  When the nation is facing a potential war, “[l]arge 
sums are wanted, on a sudden, to make the requisite preparations,” 
but loans from individuals or small banks can be too slow or entirely 
unavailable.162  If the government has the constitutional power to re-
sort to a bank in this crisis situation, it has the power to do so before 
the crisis arises:  “Anticipation is indispensible,” and, what is more, 
“[c]ircumstances may affect the expediency of the measure, but they 
can neither add to, nor diminish its constitutionality.”163  “The expe-
diency of exercising a particular power, at a particular time, must in-
deed depend on circumstances; but the constitutional right of exer-
cising it must be uniform and invariable—the same to day, as to 
morrow.”164 
The Bank was also implied from the Commerce Clause, having “a 
natural relation to the regulation of trade between the States.”165  
“Money is the very hinge on which commerce turns.”166  Scarcity of 
gold and silver coin becomes a drag on trade in the absence of bank 
credit and paper issues; a bank is thus “conducive to the creation of a 
convenient medium of exchange” to keep commerce going.167  Ham-
ilton summarizes Jefferson as having argued that “[t]o erect a bank” 
is to “create[] a subject of commerce,” but not to regulate it, no dif-
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ferent from making a bushel of wheat or mining a dollar’s worth of 
ore.168  But Jefferson’s examples, Hamilton argued, dealt only with 
plainly local “details of buying and selling.”169  The activities of a na-
tional bank would “be directed to those general political arrange-
ments concerning trade on which [the nation’s] aggregate interests 
depend,” and “whose objects are to give encouragement to the en-
terprise of our own merchants, and to advance our navigation and 
manufactures.”170  The Bank’s activities are “to be regarded as a regu-
lation of trade” by providing “facilities to circulation and a conven-
ient medium of exchange and alienation.”171 
Hamilton further supported his expansive interpretation of the 
term “regulate,” by pointing to the Territorial Clause, which author-
izes Congress “to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the territories or property of the United States;” and 
“has been construed to mean a power to erect a government,” which 
is a corporate body.172  Hamilton construed the commerce power as 
essentially parallel to that:  the power to “regulate” commerce “is a 
power to make all needful rules and regulations concerning trade.”173  
Thus, the power to regulate authorizes the creation of a public cor-
poration; why not a public-private one?  By analogy to the Territorial 
Clause, then, Congress can regulate commerce by chartering a cor-
poration for that purpose, such as a bank or even a trading company 
(like the East India Company).  And directly under the Territorial 
Clause, it can charter a corporation to manage the United States’ 
“territories or property,” the latter including the money in its Treasury, 
for which a bank corporation would be useful.174 
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As a capstone argument, Hamilton advanced a synergistic ap-
proach to interpreting congressional powers.  Taking “an aggregate 
view of the constitution,” Hamilton argued that the powers to tax and 
spend, to borrow money, to coin money and regulate foreign coin, 
and to make needful rules and regulations respecting government 
property combine to show “[t]hat it is the manifest design and scope 
of the constitution to vest in congress all the powers requisite to the 
effectual administration of the finances of the United States.”175  A 
bank is “so usual as well as so important an instrument” to execute 
this aggregate power that a “strong presumption[]” is raised in favor 
of implying a power to create a bank.176  Furthermore, banks and cor-
porations are a means implicitly residing within the sovereignty of all 
governments, as evidenced by the use of banks and trading compa-
nies by other nations.  In this light, “[l]ittle less than a prohibitory 
clause can destroy the strong presumptions” supporting the power to 
create a bank.177 
3.  Charter and Expiration 
Washington was convinced, and signed the Bank Bill into law on 
February 25, 1791.  By most accounts the First Bank fulfilled its in-
tended functions effectively over the next twenty years.  Branches 
were opened in several cities beginning in spring of 1792.178  The 
Bank acted as fiscal agent of the Treasury, making payments of inter-
est on public debt and salaries of government officials (including Jef-
ferson), brokering sales of new issues of government securities, col-
lecting taxes and customs duties, supplying gold bullion and foreign 
coins to the U.S. Mint, brokering foreign exchange, moderating the 
outflow of specie to foreign countries, providing a widespread and 
uniform circulating medium—its notes were legal tender for debts 
due the government—and serving as the principal depository of gov-
ernment funds.179  The initial opposition died down as Jeffersonians 
became reconciled to the Bank or saw its advantages.180  While Jeffer-
son’s personal dislike of the First Bank never diminished, he tem-
pered this attitude as president by deferring to the views of his Treas-
ury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, who was a great appreciator of the 
 
175 Id. at 132. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 127. 
179 Id. at 208. 
180 Id. at 205–06. 
36 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
Bank’s usefulness.  Gallatin had persuaded Jefferson to sign legislation 
authorizing the Bank to establish a New Orleans branch office, not-
withstanding the latter’s continued constitutional doubts.181  Jefferson 
also signed a bill to punish the counterfeiting of the First Bank’s 
notes.182 
Nevertheless, with the First Bank’s charter nearing its end as 1811 
approached, it appeared that its “excellent record . . . did it insuffi-
cient good politically.”183  When the First Bank was founded there had 
been only three or four other banks in the United States, all char-
tered by states.  In 1811, when the Bank’s charter expired, there were 
ninety.  Most of this explosion in state-chartered banking occurred 
after the Jeffersonian party came into power and only accelerated as 
the Federalist party disintegrated, reflecting a political shift in the 
party alignment of businessmen.  This political shift resulted from a 
democratization of American business, as the nation’s commercial 
center of gravity shifted from foreign commerce, dominated by old-
line (Federalist-leaning) coastal merchants, to an increasingly diversi-
fied internal economy.  The aristocratic circle of federalist merchants 
was overtaken by a new generation of businessmen whose interests 
and temperament would not have disposed them favorably toward a 
conservative monopolistic institution.  “The success of the Republican 
party in retaining the loyalty of the older agrarians while it recruited 
among the newer entrepreneurial masses was possible . . . because 
equality of opportunity in business and the principle of laisser faire 
could be advocated with a Jeffersonian vocabulary.”184  The profusion 
of new state banks could create more money and easy credit to meet 
the wants of these arriviste businessmen, and Jefferson himself em-
braced the idea “of making all the banks Republican.”185 
In this environment, the First Bank was destined to become a po-
litical target.  Not only was it indelibly associated with the Federalists, 
but it tended to play a restraining role on state banks’ business.  By 
1811, state banks were creating most of the credit for American busi-
nesses.  State banks, along with their customers, would want to pay 
their federal taxes with state banknotes and checks written against 
their state bank deposits.  The First Bank, as the agent for collection 
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of federal taxes, would thus inevitably become the creditor of these 
banks.  By demanding that the state banknotes and credits be re-
deemed in specie, and thereby refusing to accept non-redeemable 
notes, the First Bank could and did impose controls on state banks’ 
ability to create money and credit.186  The First Bank thus created a 
powerful restraint on inflationary paper issues, or the profligate sus-
pension of specie payment, by undercapitalized state banks.  While 
conservative state banks might appreciate this restraining, quasi-
central banking function, “[t]he reckless and speculative bankers re-
sented it.” 187 
Congress opened debate on the Bank in January 1811.188  Propo-
nents of re-chartering argued that the Bank’s constitutionality was es-
tablished by non-judicial precedent.189  A report to the Senate from 
Gallatin, who had been retained by President Madison as Treasury 
Secretary, pointed out that the Bank had been “for a number of years 
been acted upon or acquiesced in as if Constitutional by all the con-
stituted authorities of the nation.”190  Significantly, when the argu-
ment got around to identifying the enumerated powers from which 
the Bank could be implied, Jeffersonian supporters of the re-charter 
tried to harmonize their pro-Bank views with their strict construction 
principles with narrow arguments.191  They focused on the Bank’s ne-
cessity for limited fiscal functions, primarily the collection of taxes; 
Gallatin argued that the Bank was “necessary for the punctual collec-
tion of the revenue, and for the safe-keeping and transmission of 
public moneys.” 192  Other Bank supporters pointed out that the First 
Bank’s notes provided currency that facilitated the payment of taxes, 
and that by their frequent practice extending credit to merchants so 
the latter could pay their taxes, banks put themselves in the role of 
helping to collect from taxpayers.193  To the extent that some of these 
arguments referred to banks generally, rather than a national bank, 
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some opponents argued that the existence of state banks meant that 
a national bank was not indispensably necessary and was thus uncon-
stitutional (as falling outside the Necessary and Proper Clause).  Bank 
supporters countered that implied powers need only be “fairly suited 
to, and well calculated for, legitimate national objects” and that it was 
improper to force the national government to rely on state banks:  
the purpose of the Constitution was to make the United States inde-
pendent of the states for the means to carry out its objects.194 
Although the debates in Congress were dominated by constitu-
tional arguments, these were well-worn and lackluster, and historians 
are skeptical about their sincerity.  Congressional votes against the 
Bank seem to have been motivated by “real animosities, personal, so-
cial, and partisan,” and by the strong presence of state banking inter-
ests.195  The House bill to renew the charter was defeated by a single 
vote on January 24.196  A Senate bill, submitted on February 5, was de-
feated on February 20 when Vice President George Clinton cast a tie-
breaking vote against the Bank.197  While Clinton explained his vote 
with the claim that Congress lacked the power to charter corpora-
tions, his real motivation seems to have been to spite his intra-party 
political enemies, Madison and Gallatin.198 
4.  Marshall and the First Bank’s History 
Marshall was well aware of what was said by Hamilton and by the 
First Bank’s supporters in the House debates.  In his Life of George 
Washington, written between 1804 and 1807, Marshall described Ham-
ilton’s Bank Report as “containing a copious and perspicuous argu-
ment on the policy of the measure.”199  Marshall went on to summa-
rize the House debates on the bill.  Identifying the key opponents 
and supporters of the measure, Marshall summarized the debate as 
turning on the question of implied powers, which opponents argued 
were restricted to enactment of “that mean without which the end 
could not be produced.”200  The supporters responded that “when a 
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power is delegated to effect particular objects, all the known and usu-
al means of effecting them, must pass as incidental to it.”201  Marshall 
then recounted that this debate was replayed in Washington’s cabi-
net, summarizing the arguments in detail in a seven-page appendix.202 
Significantly, Marshall made special note of the argument that a 
national bank was supported by the Commerce Clause.  The Bank’s 
supporters “took a comprehensive view of those powers, and con-
tended that a bank was a known and usual instrument by which sev-
eral of them were exercised,” noting that “the utility of banking insti-
tutions” was demonstrated by the fact that “[i]n all commercial 
countries they had been resorted to as an instrument of great efficacy 
in mercantile transactions.”203 
Despite noting the connection between pro-Bank arguments and 
broad, affirmative arguments for national power, Marshall derives a 
moral to the episode that is more consistent with defensive, union-
preserving nationalism than with aggressive, power-expanding na-
tionalism.  To Marshall, the Bank debates illustrated the broader 
“conflict between the powers of the general and state governments,” 
that underlay the adoption of the Constitution, with “[t]he old line of 
division . . . still as strongly marked as ever.”204  One party “retained 
the opinion that liberty could be endangered only by encroachments 
upon the states,” and “the other party . . . sincerely believed that the 
real danger which threatened the republic was to be looked for in the 
undue ascendency of the states.”205  This party believed it necessary 
“to guard the equilibrium established in the constitution, by preserv-
ing unimpaired all the legitimate powers of the union.”206  The debate 
over the National Bank, Marshall concluded, “made a deep impres-
sion on many members of the legislature; and contributed, not in-
considerably, to the complete organization of those distinct and visi-
ble parties, which, in their long and dubious conflict for power, have 
since shaken the United States to their centre.”207  This union-
preserving focus anticipates Marshall’s approach to the McCulloch de-
cision a decade or so later. 
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C.  The War of 1812 and the Call for a Second Bank 
The First Bank closed its doors forever when its charter expired in 
February 1811.  The timing proved inopportune, creating something 
of a financial crisis.  The dissolution of the First Bank and its regula-
tory impact led naturally to a further explosion of state banks, eager 
to feed the demand for credit.  As state banks increased in number 
from ninety to 246, Gallatin estimated that their banknote circulation 
increased from $28 million to $68 million.208  The inflationary impact 
of this profusion of paper money was worsened by the fact that it 
outpaced the volume of economic transactions, as exports and the 
domestic coasting trade were severely damaged by the War of 1812.209  
At the same time, the Federal Government needed large loans to fi-
nance the war.  These had to be negotiated piecemeal with numerous 
smaller state banks on various terms, and in various locations, with ac-
tual funds not necessarily available where the government needed 
them, if the loans could be obtained at all.210 
In August 1814, the British raids on Washington and Baltimore 
touched off a run on the banks in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New 
York as customers sought to withdraw specie.211  The banks in those 
major commercial centers had to suspend payments of specie, which 
created something of a domino effect:  suspension of specie pay-
ments spread to banks throughout the country, except New Eng-
land.212  This event, though novel, resembled the state governmental 
failures to redeem paper money that had plagued the pre-
Constitution economy and demonstrated that banks, like govern-
ments, could issue paper obligations beyond their means to repay.213  
Interestingly, the suspension of specie payments did not cause a cas-
cade of bank failures.  Banks continued to operate, indeed turning 
significant profits, and their paper continued to circulate.  The main 
consequence of suspension was the heavy and non-uniform discount-
ing of banknotes, which varied in value “not only from time to time 
but at the same time from state to state and in the same state from 
place to place.”214  A dollar in circulating banknotes might be valued 
at anywhere from par to seventy-five cents, but without the First Bank 
as tax collecting agent and with specie payments suspended, the 
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Treasury had to accept these discounted banknotes in payment of 
taxes.215  This worsened the Federal Government’s already grave rev-
enue situation:  most federal revenue was derived from duties on for-
eign trade, which was significantly down due to the war.216  Efforts to 
raise money through bond issues was dismal:  it was eventually deter-
mined that, due to discounting and the scarcity of specie, some $80 
million in Treasury bonds issued by the government during the War 
of 1812 produced specie values of only $34 million.217  Soldiers were 
paid in depreciated paper currency (sometimes in notes that the gov-
ernment would not itself accept in payment of taxes) and the Treas-
ury found itself “obliged to borrow pitiful sums” simply to keep basic 
government operations going—to pay its stationery bill, for exam-
ple.218 
Against this backdrop, Congress began considering a second na-
tional bank charter in October 1814.  But a bill approved by Congress 
in January 1815 was vetoed by President Madison, because he found 
the bill inadequate on policy grounds.219  Yet in the veto message, 
Madison acknowledged that his personally held constitutional objec-
tions were “precluded . . . by repeated recognitions” of the constitu-
tionality of the First Bank “in acts of the legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial branches” coupled with “a concurrence of the general will of 
the nation.”220  Despite Madison’s constitutional blessing, Congress 
failed to pass another bank bill before it recessed for the year in 
March.221  But Madison, the First Bank’s erstwhile opponent, was now 
adamant in his support for a new bank, and in his next annual mes-
sage in December 1815, he again urged Congress to submit a new 
bank bill.222  On behalf of a House committee formed “on that part of 
the President’s Message which relates to an Uniform National Cur-
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rency,” South Carolina representative John C. Calhoun introduced a 
new Bank Bill on January 8, 1816.223 
D.  Constitutional Arguments:  Madison, Calhoun, and the Money Supply 
By this time, the sixteenth year of the Jeffersonian party’s domina-
tion of national politics, the tenor of constitutional debate over the 
Bank had shifted somewhat, along with the political center, in a 
slightly strict constructionist direction.  Hamilton had argued that 
“[t]he expediency of exercising a particular power, at a particular time, 
must indeed depend on circumstances; but the constitutional right of 
exercising it must be uniform and invariable—the same today as to-
morrow.”224  But Jeffersonian bank supporters seemed to suggest that 
the need for a national bank was dependent on circumstances, and 
had to be pegged to a current and compelling need.  With the war 
and the need for government borrowing over, the borrowing power 
thus did not seem to be a viable argument to sustain the proposed 
Second Bank.  Madison set the tone by emphasizing that a bank was 
needed because “[t]he benefits of a uniform national curren-
cy . . . should be restored to the community.”225  Gold and silver were 
in short supply due to the war; during this “temporary evil . . . until they 
can again be rendered the general medium of exchange,” Congress should 
“provide a substitute which shall equally engage the confidence and 
accommodate the wants of the citizens throughout the Union.”226  To 
accomplish this, Congress would have to choose between notes issued 
either by state banks, by a national bank, or directly from the U.S. 
Treasury.  But, as both Madison and his new Treasury Secretary Alex-
ander Dallas pointed out, state banks were not a promising solution, 
since it was their notes that were causing the problem.227 
Significantly, Madison failed to explain the precise constitutional 
basis for a national power to issue notes as a general medium of ex-
change—that is, paper money.  Strict constructionists and hard-
money advocates throughout the nineteenth century argued that the 
Coinage Clause (the power “to coin Money [and] regulate the Value 
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thereof”228) impliedly prohibited the national government’s issuance 
of paper money.  The argument for a paper money power could 
come from three places, either alone or in combination:  (1) a liberal 
construction of the Coinage Clause; (2) the Commerce Clause, since 
a uniform currency would facilitate interstate trade; or (3) an inher-
ent or implied sovereign power to determine the nature of the na-
tion’s currency.  Given Madison’s peculiar admixture of pragmatism 
and strict constructionism, it is not surprising that he cagily declined 
to specify which of these grounds he was relying on, since none of 
them are quite consistent with strict construction. 
This time around in Congress, the constitutional arguments were 
limited.  “The question of constitutionality, which had so much sin-
cere prominence in 1791 and so much insincere prominence in 
1811, had none at all in these debates of 1814, 1815, and 1816.”229  
Opposition in Congress was limited to the few remaining hard-line 
Jeffersonians joining with the few remaining Federalists, who contin-
ued to oppose the Bank on partisan grounds, and the debates fo-
cused mostly on practical questions.230 
A significant exception was the February 26, 1816 floor speech by 
Calhoun, which focused on “the cause and state of disorders of the 
national currency, and the question whether it was in the power of 
Congress, by establishing a National Bank, to remove those disor-
ders.”231  Calhoun began by elaborating on the Madison administra-
tion’s position.  The nation’s currency consisted entirely of state 
banknotes, which were “extremely depreciated, and in degrees vary-
ing according to the different sections of the country,” a state of af-
fairs which “was a stain on public and private credit.”232  Among the 
“embarrassments” of non-uniform, depreciated currency was the 
payment of government contracts and debts in depreciated currency, 
and inequalities in tax payments in violation of the constitutional re-
quirement of equality:  “the people in one section of the Union 
[might] pay perhaps one-fifth more of the same tax than those in an-
other.”233 
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But Calhoun pressed the constitutional argument further.  The 
Constitution gave Congress, in express terms, the power to regulate 
the currency of the United States, pursuant to its express power to 
“coin money.”  The Coinage Clause, Calhoun argued, was a power “to 
give a steadiness and fixed value to the currency of the United 
States.”234  When the Constitution was adopted, he argued, the money 
supply was weighted down by depreciated state treasury notes—paper 
money printed by state governments—which the Framers believed 
“could only be regulated and made uniform by giving a power for 
that purpose to the General Government.”235  The states were incapa-
ble of producing a uniform national currency.236  “[T]aking into view 
the prohibition against the States issuing bills of credit, . . . [there is] 
a strong presumption this power was intended to be exclusively given 
to Congress.”237  To be sure, the problem in 1787 was not state bank-
notes, because at that time “there was but one, the Bank of North 
America,” with a capital of only $400,000 and whose discipline and 
solidity meant that its notes were always redeemable for gold and sil-
ver.238  “No man . . . in the Convention . . . could possibly have fore-
seen” the rise of state banks, “that they would have multiplied from 
one to two hundred and sixty; from a capital of four hundred thou-
sand dollars to one of eighty millions”; and “that so far from their 
credit depending on their punctuality in redeeming their bills with 
specie, they might go on, ad infinitum, in violation of their contract, 
without a dollar in their vaults.”239  This “extraordinary revolution in 
the currency of the country,” though its source was state-chartered 
banks rather than state treasuries, nevertheless violated the spirit of 
the provisions granting the general government the power to impose 
uniformity on the currency.240  This power was fundamentally an im-
plied power from the nature of sovereignty—an argument hinted at 
by Hamilton in his 1791 memorandum and not embraced by the Su-
preme Court until 1884.241 “The right of making money” Calhoun as-
serted, is “an attribute of sovereign power, a sacred and important 
right.”242  This power was being “exercised by two hundred and sixty 
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banks, scattered over every part of the United States, not responsible 
to any power whatever for their issues of paper.”243 
The nature of the problem itself demonstrated that the power to 
correct it necessarily resided in Congress.  Calhoun estimated that 
the state banks held specie in their vaults of around $15 million with 
another $67 million in other capital, on which $170 million was circu-
lating in the form of banknotes, credits and other bank paper.244  This 
“prodigality” caused the banknotes to depreciate to the degree “that 
this paper was emphatically called trash or rags.”245  This depreciation 
of currency caused an outflow of gold and silver which in turn caused 
further depreciation and led to the suspension of specie payments, 
which “stood as cause and effect; first, the excessive issues caused the 
suspension of specie payments, and advantage had been taken of that 
suspension to issue still greater floods of it.”246  Banks might act volun-
tarily in concert to call in their notes and resume specie payment, but 
their money-making incentive would keep them from doing so.  
Therefore, “it rested with Congress” to produce concerted activity 
and “make them return to specie payments by making it their interest 
to do so.”247 
The best means of accomplishing this was with a national bank.  
By conscientiously redeeming its own notes for specie, and refusing 
to accept non-redeemable notes from other banks, a national bank 
would discipline the state banks.  It would “strip the banks refusing to 
pay specie of all the profits arising from the business of the Govern-
ment, to prohibit deposits with them, and to refuse to receive their 
notes in payment of dues to the government.”248  If banks still refused 
to resume specie payments, Congress could consider more drastic 
measures.  The restoration of specie payments “would remove the 
embarrassments on the industry of the country and the stains from its 
public and private faith.”249 
Calhoun’s argument is notably Hamiltonian.  Although Calhoun 
focused on a particular present crisis in the money supply, he 
grounded the power to charter a bank on a synergistic reading of 
several constitutional provisions together with the broad claim that 
currency control is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.  Moreover, 
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the national power to impose a uniform currency was not simply a 
power to issue national treasury or banknotes, but also necessarily en-
tailed a power to regulate the money supply by exerting control over 
the nation’s banking system.  Buttressing the argument for federal 
constitutional authority was the practical problem of a state race-to-
the-bottom.  Because a (chaotic) state banking system had emerged 
since Hamilton’s time, Calhoun could see more clearly than Hamil-
ton that a national bank had a central banking function to exercise:  
disciplining state banks’ creation of money.250 
III.  MCCULLOCH’S CONTEXT:  INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 
The question of Congress’s power to charter a national bank was 
part of a larger set of questions that dominated national constitution-
al and policy debate for much of the twenty years prior to McCulloch.  
The leaders of the nationalist side of this debate over the years in-
cluded Alexander Hamilton, John C. Calhoun, John Quincy Adams, 
and several less-remembered senators and congressmen.  The most 
important of these leaders in the congressional debates was Henry 
Clay, whose 
long and dogged battle for a legislative program of aggressive measures 
to strengthen the national economy . . . came to be called the American 
System.  Its principal elements were the Bank, internal improvements, 
and the protective tariff.  Each required an expansive interpretation of 
congressional authority; each was vigorously opposed by dedicated de-
fenders of states’ rights.  Together they presented the dominant constitu-
tional controversies of the period in the domestic field.251 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s nationalism in McCulloch (or otherwise) 
cannot be adequately judged without reference to these controver-
sies, but especially internal improvements.  By early 1819, Marshall 
would have been fully aware that the most contentious political issue 
involving implied powers was not the Bank, but internal improve-
ments.252  More specifically, the question was whether a power to 
build roads could be implied from the Commerce Clause or other 
enumerated powers.  The arguments pro and con had been exten-
 
250 See HURST, supra note 103, at 57, 159–63 (explaining central banking function).  Hurst 
argued that U.S. policymakers did not comprehend the nature of a central banking func-
tion before Nicholas Biddle’s assumption of the presidency of the Second Bank in 1823. 
Id.  But clearly, Calhoun did understand it. 
251 CURRIE, supra note 182, at 250 (citations omitted). 
252 See Gunther, supra note 34, at 7–9 (discussing the controversy over the constitutionality of 
internal improvements to the Bank); see also NEWMYER, supra note 23, at 301 (explaining 
the delicate manner with which Marshall approached legitimizing internal improvements 
to the Bank). 
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sively debated in Congress and between Congress and three succes-
sive presidents. 
The Bank controversy itself cannot be fully understood without 
reference to the rest of the American System.  The arguments for 
congressional power embraced or ignored in the Bank debate would 
also have had implications readily apparent to lawmakers at the time 
for the internal improvements question.  Thus, what Marshall did 
and did not say in McCulloch touching on the question of internal 
improvements, speaks volumes about the scope of that decision’s na-
tionalist commitments. 
A.  The Internal Improvements Controversy 
To a degree that is quite alien today, questions of public policy 
during the antebellum period were frequently debated in the politi-
cal branches as questions of constitutional interpretation.253  Prior to 
the emergence of slavery as the dominant political issue, the most 
sustained and significant constitutional debates in the antebellum pe-
riod concerned government involvement in infrastructure projects.  
Called “internal improvements” in antebellum parlance, “these pro-
jects included roads, canals, harbors, lighthouses, and, later, rail-
roads.”254  Debates over internal improvements certainly included the 
same kinds of issues involved in contemporary debates over public 
works and infrastructure projects—whether the projects are feasible 
and economically justified, which regions or legislative districts will 
receive the benefits of government spending, etc.  But, unlike today, 
the debates were often framed as federalism questions:  whether the 
federal government had the power to engage in the projects.255  
There was no doubt of a state’s power to improve its internal infra-
structure, except to the extent that a state project might somehow 
obstruct interstate commerce.  But states often lacked either the 
 
253 According to Alison LaCroix, the antebellum period “witnessed the emergence of the 
Constitution as the preeminent organizing lens through which Americans viewed political 
and legal questions.”  Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution:  Federalism in the Long 
Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 400 (2015).  This point is exemplified throughout 
David Currie’s masterful four volume work, The Constitution in Congress (1997–2005), ana-
lyzing debates on constitutional aspects of federal legislation from 1789 through 1861.  
Simply put, “[b]efore 1800 nearly all of our constitutional law was made by Congress or 
the president, and so was much of it thereafter.”  Preface to CURRIE, supra note 120, at x. 
254 LaCroix, supra note 253, at 400; accord CURRIE, supra note 182, at 250, 258–83 (describing 
the political debates over internal improvements during Madison’s presidency); HOWE, 
supra note 20, at 203–84 (discussing the internal improvements made during the early 
1800s). 
255 CURRIE, supra note 182, at 258–59. 
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money to pursue ambitious internal improvement projects, or the 
self-interest.  A road through a state or a canal connecting navigable 
waterways might benefit trade between the terminal points of the 
route without significantly benefiting the states in between.  Thus, as 
a matter of both resources and interstate interests, the call for federal 
involvement in internal improvements could be compelling. 
Less clear was the question of federal constitutional authority to 
engage in internal improvement projects.  Opponents of federal in-
ternal improvements measures could, and did, object that there was 
no general power over internal improvements in the Constitution, 
and that such a power could not be fairly implied from the enumer-
ated powers.  Presidents Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe made policy 
decisions reflecting deep ambivalence between a principle of “strict 
construction” of the powers of Congress, on the one hand, and a 
seeming desire to build up the national infrastructure, on the oth-
er.256  Each of these presidents grudgingly acknowledged some con-
gressional power over internal improvements at some point, each as-
serted general principles of constitutional limitation inconsistent with 
what they had elsewhere approved, and each recommended adoption 
of a constitutional amendment to authorize internal improvements, 
on the theory that the existing Constitution did not.257  In opposition 
to their views were those of bullish internal improvements advocates, 
such as Calhoun and Clay, who believed that the Constitution gave 
Congress a power over internal improvements.258  The views of these 
leaders, while controversial, commanded sufficiently widespread sup-
port to be well within the mainstream of political debate. 
Debates over internal improvements issues developed a significant 
body of constitutional arguments.  Nationalist proponents of the 
American System generally argued that the constitutional authoriza-
tion for Congress to undertake internal improvements projects was 
implied by the commerce, postal, and war powers.  The Commerce 
Clause argument rested on legislative precedent:  from the first Con-
gress, the Federal Government had built and maintained a nation-
wide system of aids to navigation, creating a legislative precedent for 
internal improvements under the commerce power, which was widely 
held to embrace navigation.259  This precedent also weighed in favor 
of a liberal construction of “regulating” commerce to extend to facili-
tating it.  Senator James A. Bayard of Delaware, in an 1807 committee 
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report endorsing a bill for constructing a canal to link the Delaware 
and Chesapeake Bays, argued that 
[t]he power to erect light-houses and piers, to survey and take the sound-
ings on the coast, or erect public buildings, is neither expressly given nor 
recognised [sic] in the Constitution, but it is embraced by a liberal and 
just interpretation of the clause in the Constitution, which legitimates all 
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers ex-
pressly delegated.  On a like principle the bank of the United States was incorpo-
rated.  Having a power to provide for the safety of commerce and the de-
fence of the nation, we may fairly infer a power to cut a canal, a measure 
unquestionably proper with a view to either object. 260 
During an 1816 debate on the “Bonus Bill,”261 Representative Daniel 
Sheffey of Virginia expanded on this theme.  Arguing against a nar-
row construction of “regulate” in the Commerce Clause, Sheffey as-
serted that “the word ‘regulate’” means “an entire control over the 
subject in all its relations.”262  Commerce “regulation” had served as 
the constitutional basis on which 
Congress . . . have erected light-houses, piers, and beacons; they have es-
tablished regulations for seamen in the merchant service; they have lev-
ied a capitation tax on these seamen . . . to create hospitals for the sick 
and disabled . . . .  Under the power to “regulate” commerce with the In-
dian tribes, trading houses have been erected and roads opened.  Did 
any person ever object to these acts . . . as transcending the Constitution-
al powers of this Government?263 
With the often-embarrassing military performance of the United 
States in the recently concluded War of 1812 freshly in mind, Sheffey 
added that “defence against foreign invasion” required that “roads 
and canals” were indispensable to the necessity of “collecting and 
concentrating your forces; transporting subsistence, arms, and muni-
tions; and maintaining communication” among the forces.264 
Opponents of internal improvements legislation tended to make 
strict constructionist arguments against implied powers or in favor of 
narrow constructions of granted powers.  The power to establish post 
roads was not to build them, but merely a power to designate existing 
roads and reserve a right of passage; and that the power “to regulate” 
commerce meant only a power to “prescribe the manner, terms, and 
 
260 CURRIE, supra note 182, at 120 (emphasis added). 
261 The Bonus Bill was a proposal, introduced to the House by John C. Calhoun, to create a 
fund to use as seed money for unspecified future internal improvements projects.  The 
money was to come from a $1.5 million “bonus” required to be paid by the Second Bank 
to the Treasury, as consideration for its charter rights.  Id. at 260–69. 
262 Id. at 262. 
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conditions, on which that commerce should be carried on”—not a 
power to promote commerce.265  In short, Congress had no peacetime 
power to build roads.  The war powers could not justify building 
roads when there was no war on.266  Both Presidents Madison, prior to 
McCulloch, and Monroe after it, issued controversial vetoes of major 
internal improvements bills on such grounds.267 
Internal improvement supporters vehemently disputed these 
points.  The general government could not be made to depend on 
states for the execution of its powers; therefore, the Postal Clause 
necessarily authorized the building of roads and, as Clay argued, 
once a road was built for a legitimate national purpose—say, as a mili-
tary or post road—it would not matter constitutionally if, subsequent-
ly, the majority of traffic were commercial.268  Similarly, in his January 
1819 report to the House on military roads, Calhoun (by this time 
Secretary of War) wrote that “a judicious system of roads and canals, 
constructed for the convenience of commerce and the transportation 
of the mail only, without reference to military operations, is itself 
among the most efficient means for ‘the more complete defense of 
the United States.’”269  This was because “[t]he roads and canals 
which such a system would require are, with few exceptions, precisely 
those which would be required for the operations of war.”270  The re-
port further recommended using the army to build roads and ca-
nals.271 
B.  McCulloch and Internal Improvements 
The implications of McCulloch for internal improvements must 
have been obvious to observers less keen than Marshall.  The internal 
improvements debates turned primarily on interpretive latitude to be 
given both implied powers and at least four enumerated powers—
commerce, post office, war, and territories.  All four of these were 
implicated in the Bank debates, and the arguments pro and con 
made over the years in congressional debates surfaced in the McCul-
loch oral argument.  The internal improvements issue was squarely 
 
265 Id. at 263. 
266 Id. at 263–64, 272–73. 
267 Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill on March 3, 1817, his last day in office.  See Madison, supra 
note 220, at 584.  Monroe vetoed the Cumberland Road bill in 1822.  See infra Part V.A 
(explaining President Monroe’s reasoning for vetoing the Cumberland Road bill). 
268 CURRIE, supra note 182, at 274 n.151. 
269 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 2444 app. (1819) (statement of Calhoun). 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 2443–52 app. 
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presented.  There is no doubt that the nationalist arguments were 
discernable, in the records of congressional debates and at oral ar-
gument, for Marshall to draw on.  He would not have had to go out 
very far on a political limb to do so.272  Did Marshall have a go at in-
ternal improvements?  We shall see. 
IV.  THE MCCULLOCH CASE 
A.  The Litigation 
We return to the Bank saga where we left off.  The bill to charter 
the Second Bank passed both houses in March and April 1816, after a 
few weeks of limited debate in which the Republicans overcame the 
internal divisions that had scuttled the First Bank in 1811.  The bill 
was signed by President Madison on April 10, 1816.273  The Second 
Bank, like the First, was fundamentally a private corporation, with 
some government participation.  Of its twenty-five directors (all of 
whom were required to be U.S. citizens), five were to be appointed by 
the President, and 20% of the Bank’s stock would be owned by the 
Federal Government.274 
The Second Bank did not get off to a good start.  Its first presi-
dent, William Jones, was not a competent financier, and the Second 
Bank was ineptly managed in some key respects.275  The Second Bank 
promptly established branch offices in sixteen states, which enabled it 
to fulfill one of its functions of moving federal funds around the 
country.276  But it also undertook a policy of aggressive competition 
with state-chartered private banks (something the First Bank had not 
done, despite Hamilton’s vision of the Bank as a major commercial 
lender).277  This tended to provoke state legislatures, many of which 
sought to impose taxes on the Bank, motivated either by a distrust of 
banks generally or to curtail the Second Bank’s competitive position 
in favor of their own chartered banks.278  The Second Bank also found 
itself overextended due to its aggressive lending policy, and in late 
 
272 For example, four House resolutions on internal improvements drew substantial support 
in 1818.  A power to appropriate money for internal improvements passed, and three 
others, recognizing a congressional power to construct roads and canals for postal, mili-
tary, and even commerce-facilitating purposes, were narrowly defeated.  31 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 1381–89 (1818). 
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1818 it abruptly and aggressively began calling in many of its loans as 
the economy entered a downturn.279  The rapid contraction of credit 
exacerbated (if it did not cause) a depression that became known as 
the Panic of 1819.280  The public perception of the Bank turned in-
creasingly negative.281 
This was the context in which McCulloch v. Maryland arose.  James 
McCulloh282 was the “cashier” (the manager) of the Baltimore branch 
of the Second Bank of the United States.283  Under his management, 
the Baltimore branch sought to evade control of the central Bank of-
fice, and was particularly aggressive in extending easy credit to out-
compete state banks for commercial lending business.284  McCulloh 
and his cronies also used the branch to engage in widespread finan-
cial manipulation and outright fraud.285  In February 1818, Maryland 
enacted a law “to impose a Tax on all Banks, or Branches thereof in 
the State of Maryland not chartered by the [Maryland] Legislature.”286  
The tax was imposed on notes issued by the Bank, ranging from $0.10 
to $20, depending on the amount of the note.287  Failure to pay the 
tax was punishable by fines of $100 for each offense.288  A bank could 
obtain a waiver of the tax by paying $15,000.289  When the law went in-
to effect in May 1818, McCulloh issued notes without paying the tax, 
and a Maryland treasury official brought an action for debt against 
McCulloh, as Bank cashier, to collect $2,500 in penalties on five 
notes.290  The parties agreed on a statement of facts and a Baltimore 
County court ruled that the Bank owed the tax.  The Maryland Court 
of Appeals (then the state’s highest court) affirmed. 291 
B.  The Oral Arguments 
The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court beginning on 
February 22, 1819.292  Some of the leading lawyers in the nation ar-
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gued the case.  The lawyers for Maryland included Luther Martin, Jo-
seph Hopkinson, and Walter Jones.293  The Bank’s legal team includ-
ed Daniel Webster and U.S. Attorney General William Wirt, but these 
two luminaries were outshone by the third and final member of the 
team, William Pinkney.294  The argument lasted nine days, wrapping 
up on March 3.295  Three days later, the Court issued its decision.296 
The usual broad brush reading of the arguments confirms two 
important and well-known points.  First, counsel for Maryland based 
their arguments on aggressively strict-constructionist, anti-federalist 
views of the Constitution.  Second, the McCulloch opinion consists al-
most entirely of Marshall’s summary arguments made by others.  
Counsel for Maryland made the now-familiar arguments, that the 
Constitution’s grants of powers must be strictly construed to protect 
the sovereign rights of the states.297  State sovereignty was, they ar-
gued, implicit in the nature of enumerated powers, in the Constitu-
tion’s nature as a compact of the states, and in the assurances of lim-
ited national power made by the Constitution’s supporters to 
overcome anti-federalist qualms in the ratification debates.298  Implied 
powers were limited to those absolutely or indispensably necessary to 
executing the granted power, as confirmed by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and the Tenth Amendment.299  Chartering a bank was 
a sovereign power that could not be implied.300 
These arguments, and a handful of others regarding the lack of a 
power to charter banks and the states’ power to tax concurrently with 
the national government, are familiar to us because Marshall summa-
rizes them as he proceeds to rebut them.301  Marshall’s rebuttals are 
all adopted from arguments of the Bank’s counsel, which in turn are 
thus familiar to us, even though Marshall understandably asserts 
them as the Court’s opinion without attribution.  Detailed recitation 
of those aspects of the oral argument that confirm these points would 
be unenlightening.  What makes the oral argument worth a close 
read is to identify arguments made but not addressed or adopted by 
Marshall in the McCulloch opinion; these show the limits of what Mar-
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shall was willing to do to advance the cause of nationalism in McCul-
loch. 
The lawyers for the Bank all cited its assistance to the govern-
ment’s fiscal operations as a constitutional basis.  Thus, Webster as-
serted that a national bank “is a proper and suitable instrument to as-
sist . . . in the collection and disbursement of the revenue [and] in 
the occasional anticipations of taxes and imposts.”302  Ultimately, that 
is where Marshall would ground the Bank. 
But Webster, Wirt, and Pinkney pushed beyond this point, to draw 
on the more far-reaching arguments previously made by Calhoun, 
Hamilton, and others.  Chartering the Bank was in effect an exercise 
of a power to impose a uniform national currency and regulate the 
money supply.303  This power, in turn, was necessary and proper to 
commerce regulation—“the regulation of the actual currency, as be-
ing a part of the trade and exchange between States,” according to 
Webster.304  Wirt contended that banks “dispersed throughout the 
country” are appropriate means for executing 
the enumerated powers, such as, the power of levying and collecting tax-
es throughout this widely extended empire; of paying the public debts, 
both in the United States and in foreign countries; of borrowing money, 
at home and abroad; of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and 
among the several States; of raising and supporting armies and a navy; 
and of carrying on a war.305 
Pinkney argued that the Bank was “intimately connected . . . with all 
the financial operations of the government,” including moving funds 
around the country, facilitating payment of debts and taxes, and issu-
ing loans to the government.306  But he added that the Bank “has . . . a 
close connection with the power of regulating foreign commerce, 
and that between the different States” by “provid[ing] a circulating 
medium, by which that commerce can be more conveniently carried 
on, and exchanges may be facilitated.”307 
The advocates in the McCulloch oral argument also directly ad-
dressed the commerce power in terms clearly linking it to internal 
improvements.  Insofar as we can tell from the argument summaries 
in the U.S. Reports, Maryland’s counsel did not directly confront 
Madison’s assertions that the Bank was a justifiable response to the 
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temporary problem of a specie shortage and resultant disuniformity 
in currency.  They probably hoped to sweep the Madisonian middle 
ground under the rug, in order to aid their project of portraying the 
Bank in extreme consolidationist (ultranationalist) terms.  Thus they 
described a parade of horribles in which the Bank would necessarily 
require justification under an unacceptably broad interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause.308  Walter Jones for Maryland joined issue on 
the Commerce Clause this way: 
The people never intended they should become bankers or traders of 
any description.  They meant to leave to the States the power of regulat-
ing the trade of banking, and every other species of internal industry; 
subject merely to the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce, 
and the commerce between the different States, with which it is not pre-
tended that this asserted power is connected.309 
Jones argued further that to equate the charter of a bank with com-
merce regulation of any kind would be to authorize the establishment 
of “an East or a West India company, with the exclusive privilege of 
trading with those parts of the world.”310  Even worse, in Jones’s view, 
if Congress could incorporate a bank to regulate commerce, it could 
“create corporations for the purpose of constructing roads and ca-
nals; a power to construct which has been also lately discovered 
among other secrets of the constitution, developed by this dangerous 
doctrine of implied powers.”311  Thus, Jones threw down a gauntlet on 
the Commerce Clause issue:  by expressly linking the Bank’s fate to 
internal improvements, he in essence dared the Marshall Court to is-
sue a decision that would sustain both. 
Like their adversaries, the Bank’s legal team, too, declined to em-
phasize the Madisonian middle ground defense of the Bank.  Pinkney 
took up Jones’s challenge on the Commerce Clause/internal im-
provements issue, by echoing the argument made by Hamilton and 
various members of Congress in support of implied powers:  “light 
houses, beacons, buoys, and public piers, have all been established 
under the general power to regulate commerce.”312  Because “they are 
not indispensably necessary to commerce,” the precedent demon-
strates a congressional understanding that implied powers extended 
beyond the narrow confines of indispensably necessary measures.313  
Pinkney’s primary point was to illustrate that implied powers need 
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not be strictly necessary to be constitutional.  But the hint to Mar-
shall—inviting him to venture some dicta on internal improve-
ments—must have been unmistakable. 
Nor did the Bank’s lawyers press the Madisonian argument relying 
on the immediate currency crisis as grounds to justify the Bank.  In-
stead, they preferred to make arguments more nationalistic than 
Madison’s grudging acceptance of the Bank as a constitutional fait 
accompli justified by temporary exigencies.  There was no hint in the 
arguments of Webster, Wirt, or Pinkney that the power to incorporate 
the Bank was anything other than a permanent feature of the Consti-
tution.  Hopkinson had begun his argument for Maryland with a di-
rect challenge to Hamilton’s contention that “[c]ircumstances may 
affect the expediency of the measure, but they can neither add to, 
nor diminish its constitutionality.”314  Consistent with what may have 
been a consensus position harmonizing strict construction with im-
plied powers, Hopkinson had argued: 
[A] power, growing out of a necessity which may not be permanent, may 
also not be permanent. . . . The argument might have been perfectly 
good, to show the necessity of a bank for the operations of the revenue, 
in 1791, and entirely fail now, when so many facilities for money transac-
tions abound, which were wanting then.315 
Wirt responded by pointing out the danger in this mode of constitu-
tional construction:  it was “fatal to the permanency of the constitu-
tional powers; it makes them dependent for their being on extrinsic 
circumstances, which, as these are perpetually shifting and changing, 
must produce correspondent changes in the essence of the powers 
on which they depend.”316  For Wirt, past historical episodes including 
“a period of war, the calamities of which were greatly aggravated by 
the want of this convenient instrument of finance,” could demon-
strate the existence of a contemporary power by “furnish[ing] abun-
dant experience of the utility of a national bank as an instrument of 
finance.”317  Such a reference to the very recent War of 1812 had to 
have been a powerfully resonant example. 
Finally, the Bank’s lawyers’ nationalism was evident in Pinkney’s 
two arguments repeating Hamilton’s arguments based on the Terri-
torial Clause.  First, the Territorial Clause afforded an analogy to the 
Bank.  Under the power “to make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
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States,”318 Congress had created territorial governments.  This power, 
which “has never been doubted,” was a power to charter corpora-
tions, since governmental subdivisions created by the sovereign were 
long regarded as corporate charters.319  Second, was the more aggres-
sive argument from this clause.  As Pinkney put it, “If [the United 
States] may establish a corporation to regulate [its] territory, [it] may 
establish one to regulate their property.  Their treasure is their prop-
erty, and may be invested in this mode.”320  In other words, according 
to Pinkney, the Territorial Clause was another enumerated power 
from which the Bank could be implied directly. 
Construing the Territorial Clause as a broad power to manage 
government property could have significant implications for expand-
ing congressional power.  The national government owned public 
lands both in the territories and within some state borders, and a 
power to manage those properties could support such measures as 
the building of roads and canals through states to reach federal 
lands, thereby increasing their value.  In the McCulloch decision, Mar-
shall adopted the narrower first argument analogizing corporate and 
territorial government charters.  But he did not discuss the second, 
more aggressive argument. 
C.  The Decision:  Grounding the Bank 
Every year, first-year law students across the country pose two 
questions about McCulloch that are the constitutional law equivalent 
of the boy who saw that the emperor had no clothes:  why wasn’t the 
Bank constitutional under the Commerce Clause?  And to what enu-
merated power is the Bank necessary and proper? 
One of the off-putting features of Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch 
is the difficulty of finding the answer to these questions.  This has 
frustrated some legal scholars.   According to David Currie, “Marshall 
never bothered to explain how the establishment of the Bank was 
necessary, proper, or even conducive to the execution of any of the 
powers expressly granted to Congress.”321  Gerard N. Magliocca writes 
 
318 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
319 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 386; see also 8 HAMILTON, supra note 152, at 128 (“It is 
admitted that with regard to the Western territory they give a power to erect a corpora-
tion—that is to institute a government.”); 1 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 1:9 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the chartering of municipal corporations 
by provincial governors in the colonies throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies). 
320 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 390. 
321 CURRIE, supra note 120, at 80. 
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that Marshall was “vague about which powers supported the incorpo-
ration of the Bank, but he referred to the taxing, borrowing, com-
merce, and war powers.”322  G. Edward White finds Marshall’s vague 
and conclusory connection of the Bank to an enumerated power “the 
kind of reasoning in which Marshall indulged when he really did not 
want to examine an issue in detail.”323  These criticisms echo Spencer 
Roane’s pseudonymous editorial attack on McCulloch in the Hampden 
essays, which charged that “[the Bank’s] friends have not yet agreed 
upon the particular power to which it is to be attached!”324 
In fact, Marshall upheld the Bank as “a convenient, a useful, and 
essential instrument in the prosecution of [the national govern-
ment’s] fiscal operations.”325  Marshall does not analyze this conclu-
sion, or support it beyond asserting that it is “not now a subject of 
controversy,” because “statesmen” “concerned in the administration 
of our finances, have concurred in representing its importance and 
necessity.”326  Referring to the Bank’s long historical acceptance, with 
which he began the opinion, Marshall states that “[t]he time has 
passed away when it can be necessary to enter into any discussion in 
order to prove the importance of this instrument, as a means to effect 
the legitimate objects of the government.”327  Marshall himself subse-
quently explained in his Friend of the Constitution essays, that 
After a long and perspicuous review of the arguments which have been 
urged against the act of congress which was under consideration, the 
court proceeds to the act itself, and places its constitutionality simply on 
the ground, that a bank is “a convenient, and useful, and an essential in-
strument in the prosecution of the fiscal operations of the govern-
ment.”328 
Simply, indeed.  There is no doubt that Marshall tried to keep the 
Bank’s enumerated power basis simple.  The question is, why? 
The concept of “fiscal operations” has two striking features.  First, 
as noted, “fiscal operations” are not an enumerated power.  Fiscal 
operations of the government include collecting taxes; depositing, 
 
322 Magliocca, supra note 10, at 126 n.31. 
323 WHITE, supra note 32, at 549. 
324 Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays III, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 18, 1819, reprinted in 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 72, at 125, 133. 
325 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 423. 
328 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution Essays, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5, 1819, re-
printed in MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 72, at 189–90.  Here, Marshall very slightly 
misquoted the language from McCulloch.  See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422 (“That 
it is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal opera-
tions . . . .”). 
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transporting, and disbursing money; and perhaps the more mechani-
cal aspects of borrowing.  Clearly, these matters relate to some readily 
identifiable powers, such as taxing and borrowing powers, and other 
powers which require spending money for implementation.  But “fis-
cal operations” are plainly legislative means.  Putting it in Marshall’s 
language, fiscal operations are “minor ingredients” or “subdivisions” 
of an enumerated power, but not an enumerated power in them-
selves.329  Accordingly, Marshall’s Friend of the Constitution explanation 
does not really meet the criticism that he has failed to name an enu-
merated power. 
This leads to the second, closely related point:  “fiscal operations” 
are probably not a high-level government function.  While “fiscal op-
erations” could perhaps refer to questions of national financial policy, 
the more natural reading of that term is something less.  The closest 
Marshall comes to defining what he means by fiscal operations is 
when he says that the power of “raising revenue, and applying it to 
national purposes, is admitted to imply the power of conveying mon-
ey from place to place.”330  Thus, “fiscal operations” might mean noth-
ing more than the basic handling of money:  for example, a cashier 
redeeming a Treasury note for gold is a “fiscal operation,” but the 
decision whether the note will be redeemable for gold is not, but is 
rather a matter of financial policy.  Certainly, the term does not di-
rectly pertain to any regulatory power:  neither the substance of tax 
laws, nor the substantive purposes of appropriations, nor the imposi-
tion of a uniform national currency, nor the regulation of com-
merce.331  “Administration of our finances” might be significantly 
broader than “fiscal operations,” but Marshall does not say the Bank 
is necessary and proper to national finance; rather, he says that 
statesmen “concerned in” national finance have agreed that the Bank 
is useful—to fiscal operations.332 
Marshall could easily have used language connecting the Bank to 
great questions of national financial policy.  A leading statesman 
“concerned in” the nation’s finances had been Calhoun in 1816, who 
 
329 Marshall’s distinction between implied powers as mere “subdivisions” or “minor ingredi-
ents” of enumerated powers, and enumerated powers as “great, substantive, independ-
ent” powers is discussed elsewhere.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text; infra note 
336 and accompanying text. 
330 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409.  Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary defines “fiscal” simply 
as a noun meaning “revenue.”  1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 808 (11th ed. 1797) [hereinafter SAMUEL JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY]. 
331 See HURST, supra note 103, at 80, 84–85 (defining “fiscal policy” as matters such as the 
movement of government deposits and rules for payments). 
332 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422. 
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had made an impassioned argument for a congressional power to 
regulate the currency.  However, McCulloch says nothing about any 
aspect of currency regulation:  not the Second Bank’s role in impos-
ing discipline on state banks, nor even its role in issuing banknotes 
that could serve as a uniform national currency.  This latter omission 
is particularly strange, since the McCulloch litigation arose as a dis-
pute over the issuance of national banknotes.  The Court struck down 
Maryland’s tax on the Second Bank’s notes—but nowhere does Mar-
shall explicitly acknowledge that the Bank has a power, constitution-
ally conferred by Congress, to issue those notes!  In sum, Marshall’s 
on the relatively modest concept of “fiscal operations,” even if that 
term could be stretched, suggests intentional avoidance of more far-
reaching, nationalistic claims. 
Further, by not naming any particular enumerated power, Mar-
shall begs a question of great importance to two sides of the Bank de-
bate.  Within the Jeffersonian Republican camp, both the Bank’s 
supporters and moderate opponents believed that the Bank, if it were 
to be found constitutional, would have to be pegged to one power 
connected to an existing regulatory problem.333  Treasury Secretary 
Gallatin had argued that the Bank was necessary to the collection of 
taxes; Madison had argued that the Bank was necessary in the short 
term to establishing a uniform currency.334  The Bank’s nationalist 
supporters argued that its constitutionality could be based on multi-
ple clauses, either separately or in combination, and that no present 
exigency was required.  Nowhere does Marshall endorse this view; on 
the contrary, some of his more celebrated language could be read to 
support the Madisonian view, that the Bank’s constitutional basis as 
necessary and proper may be impermanent, lasting only as long as 
the currency crisis.  Marshall famously tells us that “to endure for ages 
to come,” the Constitution must “be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs” and unforeseen “exigencies.”335  Otherwise, Marshall 
avoided these controversies by refusing to identify any enumerated 
power as the basis for the Bank’s constitutionality.  Everyone could 
find room in Marshall’s vagueness to argue one of their significant 
positions consistently with McCulloch.  Nationalists could claim that 
fiscal operations related to multiple powers; moderate Jeffersonians 
could claim that the Bank was justified merely to facilitate tax collec-
 
333 See, e.g., id. at 331–32 (highlighting the notion of an existing regulatory problem).  Hard-
line opponents opposed corporate charters per se and took the most restrictive view of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
334 See supra text accompanying notes 192, 225, 226. 
335 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415. 
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tion until state banks resumed redemption of their notes in specie; 
and all Jeffersonians (even perhaps hard line strict constructionists) 
might have noted that Marshall did not endorse a general govern-
mental power to regulate the currency.  This sort of caginess fails to 
endorse any significantly nationalist argument pressed on the Court 
at oral argument or readily found in the Bank’s history and congres-
sional debates.  If anything, Marshall’s references to crises and exi-
gencies lean in a Madisonian direction. 
At the same time, Marshall’s references to specific enumerated 
powers beyond “fiscal operations”—especially, to the commerce pow-
er—amount to little more than harmless flirtation.  Marshall men-
tions the Commerce Clause (indeed, the word “commerce”) only 
twice in the entire opinion, in both instances to make a general point 
about the nature of implied powers.  In one passage, Marshall refers 
to the Commerce Clause as a “great, substantive and independent” 
power for purposes of distinguishing it from implied powers.336  In 
the other passage, Marshall makes the general point that great enu-
merated powers require implied powers for their execution: 
Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find 
the word “bank” or “incorporation,” we find the great powers to lay and 
collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and 
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies.  The sword 
and the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion 
of the industry of the nation, are entrusted to its government.  It can 
never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them others of infe-
rior importance, merely because they are inferior.  Such an idea can nev-
er be advanced.  But it may with great reason be contended, that a gov-
ernment, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of 
which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must 
also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.  The power be-
ing given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution.  It can 
never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their in-
tention, to clog and embarrass its execution by withholding the most ap-
propriate means.337 
Is Marshall suggesting here that the Bank is necessary and proper to 
the execution of the taxing, borrowing, commerce, war, and ar-
my/naval powers?  If that were Marshall’s point, he obscures it by 
burying it in the discussion of the existence of implied powers in 
general.  Note that Marshall does not actually say that the Bank is jus-
 
336 See id. at 411 (“The power of creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, 
is not, like the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great 
substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other pow-
ers, or used as a means of executing them.”). 
337 Id. at 407–08. 
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tifiable under all—or any—of these powers; rather, his point seems to 
be that an inferior power like forming a corporation or creating a 
bank may well be implied to carry out great powers like commerce 
among others.  Elsewhere, the opinion refers to other enumerated 
powers—such as the postal power—but only as illustrations, not di-
rectly as sources.338  Neither contemporary critics nor modern readers 
of McCulloch have read the above-quoted passage as a designation of 
the enumerated source of the implied power to incorporate a bank.  
In sum, in neither of the two instances mentioning the word “com-
merce,” does Marshall suggest that the Commerce Clause might be a 
source from which to imply a power to incorporate a bank. 
Reading the opinion carefully, one sees that Marshall never actu-
ally applies his own test of “necessary and proper” laws to the Bank.  
Even assuming for the sake of argument that “fiscal operations” are 
an acceptable stand-in for some unspecified enumerated powers, 
Marshall does not offer an explicit analysis of how the Bank is “con-
ducive” or “well adapted.”  Instead, he tells us that financial experts 
find it so, and that “the time has passed” for reaching a contrary con-
clusion.339  Both G. Edward White and David Currie have speculated 
that Marshall believed the Bank could not persuasively pass his own 
“necessary and proper” test, and so he avoided the analysis to rig his 
pro-nationalist result.340  But White and Currie are both mistaken:  
Marshall avoided the analysis to make McCulloch less nationalistic, not 
more. 
To apply his “necessary and proper test” to the Bank, Marshall 
would not only have had to identify one or more specific enumerated 
powers, but construe them as well.  The most logical inference from 
McCulloch’s failure to do so is that Marshall wanted to avoid interpret-
ing any enumerated powers, and thereby embroiling the Court in 
further controversy.  The Bank could easily have been shown to meet 
Marshall’s necessary and proper test in connection with the taxing, 
borrowing, war, or commerce powers, or even the Territorial Clause.  
We have seen strong historical arguments for the national govern-
ment’s unmet need for a centralized private lender during the War of 
1812.  To rely expressly on the borrowing power or the war power in 
 
338 Id. at 417. 
339 Id. at 422–23. 
340 See WHITE, supra note 32, at 549 (“This was the kind of reasoning in which Marshall in-
dulged when he really did not want to examine an issue in detail . . . .”); David Currie, The 
Constitution in the Supreme Court:  State and Congressional Powers, 1801–1835, 49 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 887, 933–34 (1982) (“In short, Marshall devoted most of his effort to demolishing 
the straw man of indispensible necessity and slid over the real question of the propriety of 
the Bank itself.”). 
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peacetime would mean rejecting the Madisonian argument that the 
Bank’s constitutionality depended on a link to a current exigency.  
To rely on the commerce power would provide support for the con-
stitutional argument for internal improvements.  Significantly, Mar-
shall deemed it important to make direct refutations of two argu-
ments of Maryland’s counsel:  the argument advancing compact the-
theory, and the argument asserting that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause was a limiting provision. 
But Marshall did not think it necessary or proper to make a direct 
and open refutation of Jones’s argument that the power to incorpo-
rate a bank was unconnected to commerce.  Lest there be any doubt 
about Marshall’s awareness of the Bank’s relation to commerce, con-
sider his own statement about the First Bank in his Life of Washington:  
“the utility of banking institutions” was demonstrated by the fact that 
“[i]n all commercial countries they had been resorted to as an in-
strument of great efficacy in mercantile transactions.”341  Marshall could 
easily have repeated that statement in McCulloch—but he did not. 
D.  The Decision:  Internal Improvements 
The McCulloch opinion steers entirely clear, not only of com-
merce, but also of internal improvements.  Marshall’s examples of 
analogous legislative precedents for implied powers are unimpressive, 
and strikingly omit Pinkney’s reminder that the building of light 
houses and other navigational aids demonstrate an implied power to 
regulate commerce.  Webster had argued that the Bank’s ability to 
regulate currency made it “a part of the trade and exchange between 
the States.”342  Marshall’s unwillingness to embrace Webster’s argu-
ment to the Court, or Calhoun’s argument to Congress about a na-
tional power to regulate currency, is most plausibly seen as motivated 
by a desire to avoid linking the Bank to an interpretation of the 
commerce power that would support internal improvements. 
Embracing Pinkney’s argument regarding the Territorial Clause 
would likewise have implications favorable to internal improvements.  
The implication of Pinkney’s argument was twofold.  First, Congress 
had an implied power to “manage” its property to increase its value 
(e.g., by obtaining interest on its “treasure” by making deposits in the 
Bank).  Second, the Territorial Clause could imply powers beyond 
 
341 See 4 MARSHALL, supra note 199, at 392–93 (emphasis added) (describing the utility of 
banking institutions in commercial countries). 
342 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 325 (referencing Daniel Webster’s arguments from 
his representation of the Bank). 
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regulations acting directly within or upon the territories.  Such an ar-
gument could support an implied power to build roads going to the 
territories, which would increase immigration to them and promote 
statehood.  It could also support building roads going to public lands 
outside or within the states, since that would certainly increase their 
sale value.  Marshall did not discuss these facets of the Territorial 
Clause argument. 
Equally significant was Marshall’s avoidance of the argument that 
the national government had an implied power to impose a uniform 
national currency.  Such a power had been derived by others from 
the nature of sovereignty itself, or from a synergistic reading of sever-
al clauses of the Constitution.  Pinkney argued that “[t]he power of 
erecting corporations . . . is a necessary means of accomplishing the 
ends of all governments.  It is an authority inherent in, and incident 
to, all sovereignty.”343  In other words, while the power of incorpora-
tion was only ever a means to execution of a power, it is potentially a 
means to any and all powers.  As we have seen, both Hamilton in 
1791 and Calhoun in 1816 had argued in more far-reaching fashion 
that the power to impose a uniform national currency was an inher-
ent attribute of sovereignty.344  Whereas Pinkney and Webster were 
making the point that incorporation was not in itself a “great power,” 
but always a means to executing a more important and substantive 
power, Hamilton and Calhoun were suggesting that a great substan-
tive power could be implied through a synergistic reading of several 
clauses relating to money.  Marshall did not venture to adopt, or even 
acknowledge this latter, more nationalistic argument.  The Supreme 
Court would embrace the Hamilton-Calhoun argument in the third 
Legal Tender Case (inaptly citing McCulloch!) in 1884.345  Marshall 
merely says that the challenge to an implied power under the Tenth 
Amendment’s reservation of rights to the states must “depend on a 
fair construction of the whole instrument.”346  But even if this suggests 
a synergistic interpretation, Marshall does not actually employ one.  
Fiscal operations are logistical elements attaching independently to 
each of several powers (taxing, borrowing, spending, war, etc.), and 
do not constitute a more general power implied by combining those 
several.  Contrast that with Calhoun’s claim of a federal power to 
 
343 Id. at 383 (referencing Pinkney’s argument on behalf of the plaintiff about inherent pow-
ers of sovereignty).  Webster made a similar point.  See id. at 326. 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 175, 223 (articulating the extent of Hamilton’s and 
Calhoun’s viewpoints on the connection between legal tender and sovereignty). 
345 Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449–50 (1884). 
346 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406 (narrowing the scope of Marshall’s comments). 
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regulate the currency—stemming from various more specific consti-
tutional clauses.  Marshall, for his part, does not embrace the idea 
that the whole of a cluster of constitutional provisions may be greater 
than the sum of its parts, or may together imply a more general pow-
er. 
The best case to be made for teasing some endorsement of inter-
nal improvements out of McCulloch comes from two passages.  First, 
the above quoted “vast powers” paragraph might have pleased Hamil-
ton or Henry Clay, particularly the suggestion that “[t]he sword and 
the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the 
industry of the nation, are entrusted to its government.”347  That lan-
guage is nationalistic but highly abstract.  When we look at Marshall’s 
concrete examples, we can find this passage, which Kent Newmeyer 
interprets as Marshall’s “override” of Madison’s Bonus Bill veto:348 
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexi-
co, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be collected and ex-
pended, armies are to be marched and supported.  The exigencies of the 
nation may require that the treasure raised in the north should be trans-
ported to the south, that raised in the east conveyed to the west, or that 
this order should be reversed.349 
 
347 See id. at 407 (emphasis added) (demonstrating how the “vast powers” language supports 
the notion that the power to establish a uniform national currency is inherent in sover-
eignty).  For a full quotation of the passage, see supra text accompanying note 337. 
348 See Newmyer, supra note 34, at 880 (“Marshall’s implied powers doctrine made an 
amendment unnecessary—a point which became abundantly clear when, in an obiter dic-
tum, he referred to the need for federal improvements to bind together the territories 
acquired in the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819.”).  Newmyer refers to the passage in McCul-
loch referring to “this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico.”  McCul-
loch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408. 
349 Id. (emphasis omitted) (illustrating that even Marshall’s more concrete examples remain 
vague and abstract).  Jack Balkin suggests that this language shows Marshall peering into 
the future and outlining a prophetic image of the continental republic that would not be 
realized for decades.  See Jack M. Balkin, The Use that the Future Makes of the Past:  John Mar-
shall’s Greatness and its Lessons for Today’s Supreme Court Justices, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1321, 1336–37 (2002) (suggesting that Marshall engaged in “prophecy”).  That seems to 
make too much of the quotation.  Marshall himself disavowed any aggrandizing inten-
tions in writing that passage, pointing out that it accurately described current national 
boundaries plus territorial claims.  Dismissing Hampden’s “charge of having ‘pompously 
swelled, and greatly exaggerated’ the limites [sic] of the United States,” Marshall asks 
rhetorically, “[i]s not Louisiana bounded by the Gulph of Mexico to the south? . . . And 
do we not, independent of our unratified treaty with Spain, claim the mouth of the Co-
lumbia, which empties into [the Pacific] [O]cean?”  John Marshall, A Friend of the Consti-
tution Essays, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 3, 1819 reprinted in MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra 
note 72, at 182.  Marshall may also, more prosaically, have been hoping to curry favor 
with Jeffersonian opponents of the Bank by attempting to show that the Bank’s opera-
tions could actually serve their projects and interests involving westward expansion. 
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Do these quotations, separately or together, suggest it is necessary 
and proper for Congress to build a road?  Probably not.  Both passag-
es are sufficiently ambiguous to support interpretations consistent 
with Madison’s—and, as we shall see, Monroe’s—restrictive views on 
internal improvements. 
Let’s start with the “vast powers” passage, which refers to the en-
trustment of industry to the national government.  Since Marshall 
never said—neither here nor in Gibbons v. Ogden350—that interstate 
commerce included manufacturers,351 the passage may be referring 
only to the interstate trade in goods produced by industry (the “con-
siderable portion”).  It might also be understood to refer to tariffs, 
which nationalists argued could be used for protectionist promotion 
of domestic industry.  And if this is merely an allusion to tariffs, it 
would represent at most a tepid endorsement of the American System 
as a whole, reaching only its least controversial plank—protective tar-
iffs had been consistently enacted since the first Congress and would 
not be seriously contested until a few years after McCulloch.352  Howev-
er one interprets Marshall’s reference to industry, it raises this ques-
tion:  if Marshall was willing to reach out in dicta to aspects of the 
American System, why not offer some dicta clearly indicating that the 
national government has the power to build a road? 
But Marshall does not speak plainly about roads.  The second 
quotation (“St. Croix to the Gulph”) is not necessarily about roads, 
but more likely about the power to move money around the country. 
Troops are marched and supported—they must be paid.  The absence 
of regional branches of a national bank meant that, as we have seen, 
troops had to be paid in depreciated state banknotes that were not 
redeemable in specie and would not even be accepted by the U.S. 
treasury in payment of taxes.353  The Second Bank could issue notes 
and its regional branches would hold specie reserves with which to 
redeem them. 
Even if we were to read the quotation to refer to roads, Marshall 
seems unwilling to acknowledge a federal power to build them.  Many 
 
350 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
351 See infra text accompanying notes 395–96 (noting the absence of Marshall’s views on in-
terstate commerce and manufacturing).  Howard Gillman has argued that Marshall in 
Gibbons “made it as clear as he could in a case where the issue was not raised that manu-
facturing was not part of commerce.”  Gillman, supra note 42, at 422.  Gillman contends 
that Marshall, like virtually all nineteenth century legal elites, believed commerce was lim-
ited to “interstate exchange and traffic.”  Id. at 423. 
352 CURRIE, supra note 182, at 285–88. 
353 See supra text accompanying notes 217–18 (explaining how payment in depreciated 
banknotes created troop payment issues). 
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who conceded the implied powers to carry treasure or march armies 
did not concede that this implied a power to build a road.  Marshall 
made no effort to contradict this view.  If anything, he seems to en-
dorse it.  In a later example, Marshall addresses the postal power this 
way: 
Take, for example, the power “to establish post offices and post roads.”  
This power is executed by the single act of making the establishment.  But, 
from this has been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail 
along the post road, from one post office to another.  And, from this im-
plied power, has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal 
letters from the post office, or rob the mail.354 
Note that Marshall does not say that the power to establish post 
roads implies the power to build post roads.  A widely held position 
on the limited-government side of the internal improvements debate 
maintained that the power to “establish post-roads” simply meant to 
set postal routes on already-existing roads, rather than to build new 
ones.355  Such roads would have been built by states or state-chartered 
corporations.  Marshall’s carefully worded assertion that “[t]his pow-
er is executed by the single act of making the establishment” is entirely 
consistent with the limited view.356  To be fair, in this passage, Mar-
shall was making a different point—to belie the “strict necessity” in-
terpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause by demonstrating 
the existence of uncontroverted implied powers that were not indis-
pensably necessary.  Nevertheless, this is all Marshall has to say about 
roads. 
Marshall doesn’t breathe another word about internal improve-
ments in the rest of the opinion.  The strongest indication of Mar-
shall’s failure to endorse internal improvements is found in the two-
page passage in which he describes examples of implied powers.  The 
list is strikingly lame.  The power to establish post offices and post 
roads implies, not a power to build them, but a power to deliver the 
 
354 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 417 (1819) (emphasis added). 
355 See, e.g., Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 181 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he authority vested in Congress by the Constitution to establish post-roads, confers 
no right to open new roads, but implies nothing beyond a discretion in the government 
in the regulations it may make for the Post-office Department for the selection amongst 
various routes . . . .”); James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of 
Internal Improvements, in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 157 (James D. Richardson ed. 1898) (“The idea of a right to 
lay off the roads of the United States on a general scale of improvement, to take the soil 
from the proprietor by force, to establish turnpikes and tolls, and to punish offenders in 
the manner stated above would never occur to any such person.”). 
356 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417 (emphasis added). 
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mail and “to punish those who steal letters.” 357  A federal criminal 
code in general is a set of implied powers—though Marshall men-
tions no other specific crimes except for two crimes against courts, 
perjury and falsifying records.358  Finally, Marshall mentions the pow-
er to require that officeholders take an oath.359  This is a precedent 
for an implied power to charter a bank?  Spencer Roane laughed at 
him (rightly) for this one.360  What is missing from this list is the legis-
lative precedent for a congressional power to build “light houses, bea-
cons, buoys & public piers,” which Hamilton had identified as “a de-
cisive example” of an implied power.361  It had been argued in 
Congress as a constitutional justification both for internal improve-
ments and for the Bank.  Deploying this example would have ce-
mented the connection between McCulloch and internal improve-
ments.  Pinkney encouraged Marshall to do it.  Jones dared Marshall 
to do it.  Marshall shrank from the challenge. 
E.  The Decision:  Implied Powers 
It remains to consider whether Marshall’s interpretation of the 
general concept of implied powers in McCulloch by itself justifies the 
aggressive nationalism characterization.  In this Part, I argue that 
Marshall’s approach to implied powers reflects moderate, rather than 
aggressive nationalism.  He declines to adopt the most nationalistic 
available arguments on three related questions:  the definition of im-
plied powers, the scope of judicial review under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, and the interpretation of enumerated powers. 
1.  The Definition of Implied Powers 
The conception of implied powers articulated in McCulloch was 
more moderate and less aggressively nationalistic than is supposed in 
the conventional account.  The core of McCulloch’s analysis is that 
Congress has “implied powers,” which are not specified in the Consti-
tution.  These implied powers are “subdivisions” or “minor ingredi-
ents” of the “great” or enumerated powers: 
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of 
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may 
 
357 Id. at 416–18. 
358 Id. at 417. 
359 Id. at 416. 
360 Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 18, 1819, reprinted in 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 72, at 131–32. 
361 See supra text accompanying note 153. 
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be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, 
and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind.  It would probably 
never be understood by the public.  Its nature, therefore, requires, that 
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designat-
ed, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced 
from the nature of the objects themselves.  That this idea was entertained 
by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred 
from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.  Why else 
were some of the limitations, found in the ninth section of the 1st  arti-
cle, introduced?  It is also, in some degree, warranted by their having 
omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a 
fair and just interpretation.  In considering this question, then, we must 
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.362 
In sum, there are two kinds of powers, enumerated and implied.  The 
enumerated powers are “the great powers of the national govern-
ment” and what Marshall equates with “ends.”  “Implied” powers are 
the “means” for implementing those ends, and a more specific level 
of detail, beneath the “great outlines” of what can be covered in a 
constitution.  Moreover, the two categories are entirely separate and 
distinct.  According to Marshall, “a great substantive and independ-
ent power . . . cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or 
used as a means of executing them.”363  Marshall’s most succinct 
statement of the principle is this one:  “the powers given to the gov-
ernment imply the ordinary means of execution.”364 
Applying this framework to the Bank, Marshall insists that the 
Bank is an ordinary legislative means.  Maryland’s lawyers had insisted 
that the Bank “appertains to sovereignty,” but, Marshall replied, that 
makes it no different from any other law, since “all legislative powers 
appertain to sovereignty.”365  Moreover, Marshall argued, incorpora-
tion is not, like the enumerated powers, a legislative end in itself, but 
always a means.366 
In fact, the problem of implied powers generally, and of an im-
plied power to incorporate a bank, does not fall into place quite so 
easily.367  A great deal can be said on this subject, but for present pur-
 
362 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis omitted). 
363 Id. at 411. 
364 Id. at 409. 
365 Id. at 409–10. 
366 Id. at 411. 
367 Why, for instance, do we need to analyze the “ordinary means of execution” of an enu-
merated power as another type of “power” at all?  Since legislative power can only be im-
plemented by the making of laws, executing granted legislative powers should not neces-
sarily be viewed as a different kind of power.  And “means to an end” versus “end in itself” 
is not a consistent touchstone to distinguish enumerated from implied powers, because at 
least some, if not most, enumerated powers are means to other legislative ends.  Marshall 
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poses, one observation suffices.  The Second Bank—which Andrew 
Jackson would soon be calling a “Monster”—was a major power cen-
ter.368  Engaged in far more than mere “fiscal operations” of the gov-
ernment, it exerted control over some 300 state banks by 1819.369  It 
strains Marshall’s scheme to the breaking point to characterize the 
Second Bank as a “subdivision” or “minor ingredient” of one of the 
enumerated powers—except, perhaps a broadly construed commerce 
power.  This conceptual difficulty stems directly from Marshall’s dog-
ged unwillingness to acknowledge that there might be implied pow-
ers comparable in substance and “greatness” to at least some enu-
merated powers—reflecting, in turn, Marshall’s determination to 
avoid more aggressively nationalist formulations of implied powers. 
Marshall might have embraced the argument that a power to im-
pose a uniform national currency was implied by the Coinage and 
Counterfeiting Clauses, in conjunction with the prohibition on state 
paper issues, or as an attribute of national sovereignty.  Such argu-
ments had been advanced by Hamilton and Calhoun in the political 
arena and were suggested at oral argument.  Crucially, both of these 
versions of the monetary power argument were more nationalistic 
than Marshall’s approach.  They would not have conformed to Mar-
shall’s tidy “great powers/inferior powers” formula, and he did not 
adopt either of them. 
Pinkney, in arguing for the Bank, had proposed a more national-
istic solution to the general conceptual problem of implied powers 
than Marshall’s great/inferior powers formula.  In Pinkney’s schema-
tization, the “national objects” were those set out in the preamble:  
“[a] more perfect union is to be formed; justice is to be established,” 
etc.370  Pinkney continues, “[f]or the attainment of these vast objects, 
 
himself seems to have been aware of some of these conceptual problems, because when 
defending his implied power analysis in subsequent newspaper articles, he tried to change 
it.  In effect, he departed from McCulloch by recognizing three, rather than two, catego-
ries:  enumerated powers, implied powers, and laws that directly effectuated an enumer-
ated power.  Marshall, supra note 72, at 172–76.  For a contemporary discussion of some 
of the issues raised by implied powers, see generally John Mikhail, The Constitution and the 
Philosophy of Language:  Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063 
(2015) (arguing that, like a corporate charter, the Constitution, especially the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, gives the national government implied powers to fulfill its purpose).  
See also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L. J. 1738, 
1745–55 (2013) (arguing that Marshall’s great powers/inferior powers approach is cor-
rect and sound); supra notes 40–50 (citing to extensive academic literature on implied 
powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
368 HOWE, supra note 20, at 376. 
369 HAMMOND, supra note 59, at 145, 197–200. 
370 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 381 (paraphrasing the Preamble to the United States 
Constitution). 
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the government is armed with powers and faculties corresponding in 
magnitude.”371  He then proceeds to list the Article I, Section 8 pow-
ers.372  Instead of limiting himself to two rigid categories, as Marshall 
did, Pinkney describes a cascade of ends-means relationships depend-
ing on the level of specificity of the statute under consideration: 
Many particular means are, of course, involved in the general means 
necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly granted, and, in that 
case, the general means become the end, and the smaller objects the 
means. 
It was impossible for the framers of the constitution to specify prospec-
tively all these means, both because it would have involved an immense 
variety of details, and because it would have been impossible for them to 
foresee the infinite variety of circumstances in such an unexampled state 
of political society as ours, forever changing and forever improving.  How 
unwise would it have been, to legislate immutably for exigencies which 
had not then occurred, and which must have been foreseen but dimly 
and imperfectly . . . .   The statute book of the United States is filled with 
powers derived from implication.373 
For Pinkney, all “laws are but means to promote the legitimate end of 
all government—the felicity of the people.”374 
While Pinkney’s approach has its problems, it is plainly more na-
tionalistic than Marshall’s.  By recognizing that enumerated powers 
need not be ends in themselves, but can themselves be means to oth-
er ends, Pinkney freed his analysis from the constraint of having to 
minimize all implied powers as necessarily “inferior” to, let alone 
“subdivisions of,” the enumerated powers.  Further, Pinkney recog-
nizes that “all laws are means.”375  In this schematization, it becomes 
unnecessary to assign a separate constitutional status as a “power” to 
any particular law.  Pinkney’s account assumes that there is no consti-
tutional difference between laws that resemble “substantive” or “in-
dependent” powers and those that appear to be logical “subdivisions.”  
They are all, equally, means; and they are all within congressional 
power if they subserve any recognized national power, and even in 
some cases, if they do not, so long as they serve the great objects in 
the preamble.  To be sure, the latter idea sits uncomfortably next to a 
strict enumeration-based application of the doctrine of limited pow-
ers.  Marshall seems to have been intent on satisfying his audience 
that he was thoroughly committed to the doctrine of enumerated 
 
371 Id. 
372 Id. at 381–82. 
373 Id. at 384–85. 
374 Id. at 384. 
375 Specifically, Pinkney argues that “laws are but means to promote the legitimate end of all 
government the felicity of the people.”  Id. 
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powers, at the expense of a more nationalistic (and possibly more co-
herent) theory of implied powers that could account for more signif-
icant powers that did not fit neatly into a “mere means”/“inferior 
powers” box. 
2.  The Necessary and Proper Clause and Judicial Review 
McCulloch raises themes of nationalism and judicial review that 
converge around the question of the Court’s deference to Congress’s 
own claims about the scope of its constitutional powers.  A deferential 
approach to the question of scope is inherently more nationalist than 
a non-deferential approach.  The Court cannot create expansive na-
tional legislation, such as building a road or chartering a bank, but it 
can make room for or “invite” such legislation.  Deference on the 
question of the extent of Congress’s power is expansive.  Thus, an 
important element of McCulloch’s nationalism is its interpretation as a 
case standing for broad deference to the judgment of Congress as to 
the scope of its implied powers.  Here again, Marshall declined to 
take the clearest and most nationalistic position available to the 
Court. 
McCulloch’s aggressive nationalism reputation stems in large part 
from its rejection of Maryland’s argument that “necessary and prop-
er” should be narrowly construed.  Counsel for Maryland argued that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause “limit[ed] the right to pass laws for 
the execution of the granted powers, to such as are indispensable, 
and without which the power would be nugatory”;376 and that “it ex-
cludes the choice of means, and leaves to Congress, in each case, that 
only which is most direct and simple.”377  Marshall famously rejected 
this position.  “Necessary” in ordinary speech can mean “convenient, 
or useful, or essential” and the Constitution elsewhere uses the modi-
fier “absolutely” when intending to use the word “necessary” in a 
more restrictive sense.378  And he argues that the Clause’s inclusion 
among the Article I, Section 8 powers, rather than the Article I, Sec-
tion 9 limitations, of Congress defeats the idea that the clause is a lim-
itation.379  After this, Marshall circles back to his broader argument 
from constitutional interpretation: 
 
376 Id. at 413. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. at 413–15 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No state shall, without the Consent of 
the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing it’s inspection laws . . . .”)). 
379 Id. at 419–20 (“The clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limita-
tions on those powers.”). 
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The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare 
of a nation essentially depends.  It must have been the intention of those 
who gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, 
their beneficial execution.  This could not be done by confiding the 
choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of 
Congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were con-
ducive to the end.  This provision is made in a constitution intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs.  To have prescribed the means by which govern-
ment should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to 
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the proper-
ties of a legal code.  It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by 
immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been 
seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.  To have 
declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without 
which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive 
the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its 
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.380 
While on the surface, this language seems to support an aggressive 
nationalism interpretation of McCulloch, two ambiguities should be 
noted as an initial matter.  First, the repeated references to “crises” 
and “exigencies” gives traction to a narrower interpretation that 
McCulloch was meant to track Madison’s argument that the power to 
charter the Bank existed to meet a current emergency, and would re-
cede as the emergency did. 
Second, Marshall uses twenty-four different terms (by my count) 
for his interpretation of “necessary and proper,” creating potential 
ambiguities about the scope of the implied powers.  Words and 
phrases like “convenient,” “useful,” “conducive,” “adapted,” and “free 
use of means” suggest more latitude for Congress.381  Those such as 
“direct,” “needful,” “requisite,” “required” and “essential” seem more 
restrictive.382  Other terms may be in between but suggest some room 
for judicial second-guessing of Congress.  His occasional use of super-
latives seemingly suggests that Congress’s discretion should aim at 
choosing “the best,” “most convenient,” “most appropriate” or “most 
advantageous[]” means,383 while other terms suggest some sort of 
 
380 Id. at 415–16 (emphasis omitted). 
381 Id. at 409, 413, 415, 419, 420. 
382 Id. at 411, 418.  Today, essential means “1. absolutely necessary . . . 2. relating to the es-
sence of a thing.”  See Essential, WORDREFERENCE.COM, http://www.wordreference.com/
definition/essential (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (providing the definition of essential).  
This order of usage may have been reversed in Marshall’s time; obviously he did not use 
“essential” to mean “absolutely necessary.”  But see SAMUEL JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra 
note 330, at 721 (defining essential as “1. [n]ecessary to the constitution or existence of 
any thing”). 
383 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 408, 409, 411, 419. 
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scrutiny of the congressional decisionmaking process or an objective 
test of necessity: “really calculated,” “plainly adapted,” “ordinary,” 
“usual,” or “appropriate.”384 
The Bank’s lawyers argued that the Court should adopt a more 
deferential posture on questions of congressional power.  While they 
seemed comfortable asserting a strong judicial review role for the 
Court as a general matter,385 their arguments leaned the other way in 
two key points.  First, they suggested that the constitutional question 
had been settled largely by legislative precedent.  As Wirt argued, 
“[it]ought not now to be questioned, after its exercise ever since the 
establishment of the constitution, sanctioned by every department of 
the government.”386  Deferring to legislative precedent, of course, 
acknowledges at least a parallel, if not a superior authority of the 
elected branches to create precedential interpretations of the Consti-
tution. 
Second, and related, the Bank’s lawyers argued that the judicial 
test of constitutionality should be limited by setting a very high bar 
for striking down an act of Congress.  Webster argued that the chal-
lenger must show that the law “has no fair connection with the execu-
tion of any power or duty of the national government, and that its 
creation is consequently a manifest usurpation.”387  Pinkney’s argu-
ment was even more assertive.  For Pinkney, “[t]he vast variety of pos-
sible means, excludes the practicability of judicial determination as to 
the fitness of a particular means.”388  The Court can hold a law uncon-
stitutional on this basis only if it appears to be “violently and unnatu-
rally forced into the service, or fraudulently assumed, in order to 
usurp a new substantive power of sovereignty.”389  Pinkney argued fur-
ther that “Congress is, prima facie, a competent judge of its own con-
 
384 Id. at 408, 409, 421, 423 (emphasis added). 
385 For instance, Webster reassured the Court that the Constitution “confides to this Court 
the ultimate power of deciding all questions arising under the constitution and laws of 
the United States.”  Id. at 327. 
386 Id. at 352; see also id. at 322 (quoting Webster:  “it was not now to be considered as an 
open question”).  As Magliocca has argued, legislative precedent was the prevailing mode 
of constitutional interpretation for most of the antebellum period.  Gerard N. Magliocca, 
Veto!  The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 205, 220–23 (1999). 
387 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326 (1819). Wirt’s argument hewed 
more closely to the position adopted by Marshall, when he said that “the danger of the 
abuse [of implied powers] will be checked by the judicial department, which, by compar-
ing the means with the proposed end, will decide whether the connection is real, or as-
sumed as the pretext for the usurpation of powers not belonging to the government. . . .”  
Id. at 359. 
388 Id. at 387 
389 Id. at 387. 
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stitutional powers.”390  Strikingly, he says “powers,” not “implied pow-
ers.”  Marshall, in contrast, seems to hold that Congress is merely the 
judge of the relation between an enumerated and an implied power, 
and not of the scope of its enumerated powers. 
The McCulloch opinion, though equivocal, ultimately settles on a 
less deferential formula than that urged by Webster and Pinkney.  
Marshall begins with an aggressive assertion of the Court’s role:  
“[o]n the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution of 
our country devolved this important duty” of “decid[ing] peacefully” 
a question of “the conflicting powers of the government of the Union 
and of its members.”391  But then Marshall promptly backtracks, in a 
long passage admitting that Congress’s power to incorporate a bank 
has been settled by the practice and precedent of the elected branch-
es.392  In articulating a deferential approach to the specific question of 
the Bank’s constitutionality, Marshall suggests that there is a high bar 
for a judicial finding of unconstitutionality:  “It would require no or-
dinary share of intrepidity to assert that a measure adopted under 
these circumstances was a bold and plain usurpation, to which the 
constitution gave no countenance.”393  That the Constitution “gives 
no countenance” to a “bold and plain usurpation” supports the ar-
gument that would be made by James Bradley Thayer eight decades 
later, that a court can strike down legislative acts only when their un-
constitutionality is “so clear that it is not open to rational question.”394  
Marshall seems to think that this principle applies, if not across the 
board, then at least to well-precedented congressional enactments. 
Such ambiguity—or perhaps ambivalence—about the roles of the 
Court and Congress sets a tone that persists throughout the opinion.  
On one hand, Congress has seemingly unreviewable discretion to de-
termine how best to implement the granted national powers to serve 
the needs of the people. 
[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the 
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which 
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable 
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most 
beneficial to the people.395 
 
390 Id. at 380. 
391 Id. at 400–01. 
392 Id. at 401. 
393 Id. at 402. 
394 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). 
395 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. 
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Yes, but (in Marshall’s next sentence):  “Let the end be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional.”396 
Marshall’s definition of necessary and proper gives Congress dis-
cretion over choice of means.  But of course this choice appears to be 
hedged about with implicit reservations of judicial function.  “Let the 
end be legitimate” means “assuming the end is legitimate”—i.e., that 
it is within the grant of enumerated powers.  But that is always the 
vexed question:  if commerce does not include domestic manufac-
tures, then promoting domestic manufactures is not a “legitimate 
end . . . within the scope of the constitution” that can justify the 
means of building a road or bridge.  Marshall does not say it is for the 
Court to determine whether the end is legitimate—his style is to 
hedge—but that is a fair implication.  As we also know, even if the 
end is legitimate, the means might run afoul of a constitutional pro-
hibition.  Here, Marshall suggests, such prohibitions may be express 
or implied from the “spirit” of the Constitution—phrasing that greatly 
expands the potential grounds for judicial limitations of congression-
al powers. 
The other famous passage on this theme is equally ambiguous. As 
he winds up his conclusion that the Bank is constitutional, Marshall 
alludes to the broad public consensus that the Bank’s operations have 
been necessary to the government’s “fiscal operations.”397  He then 
reformulates the statement about congressional discretion and judi-
cial review: 
But, were [the Bank’s] necessity less apparent, none can deny its be-
ing an appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as has 
been very justly observed, is to be discussed in another place.  Should 
Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are pro-
hibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of ex-
ecuting its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not en-
trusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this 
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say 
that such an act was not the law of the land.  But where the law is not 
prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted 
to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its 
necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial de-
 
396 Id. at 421 (emphasis added). 
397 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422. 
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partment, and to tread on legislative ground.  This court disclaims all 
pretensions to such a power.398 
There are two levels of ambiguity in this passage.  The first level is 
the Court’s role in second-guessing legislative choice of means.  Con-
gress has, Marshall seems to suggest, unreviewable discretion to de-
termine the “degree of . . . necessity”—that determination is to be 
made “in another place” and the Court “disclaims all pretensions” to 
decide that question.  Or does it?  The Court will undertake the 
“painful duty” to invalidate a law that is not “really calculated”—or 
“plainly adapted,” “convenient,” “essential” or any of the other adjec-
tives salted through the opinion—to an end within the enumerated 
powers.  We have come to understand this as a kind of rationality re-
view, asking whether a chosen means is logically connected to the 
identified legitimate ends.  We have already seen that Marshall’s 
twenty-four or so descriptors of this idea encompass a range from 
more to less deferential.  There are numerous examples of the Su-
preme Court striking down laws as failing a rationality test; before 
1937, rationality review was much less deferential than it is today.399  
More to the point, the test does in fact examine the degree of con-
nection between means and ends; it simply imposes a relatively low 
threshold for sustaining that connection.  This is quite different from 
a doctrine holding that the existence of any asserted means-ends 
connection is a political question.400  But Marshall does not actually 
say that the degree of necessity is to be judged deferentially by the 
Court:  he says it is not to be judged by the Court at all—twice in fact 
in the paragraph quoted above.  And in the same paragraph, he says 
that it is. 
The second level of ambiguity goes to legislative ends.  Marshall 
has already implied that the Court reserves this question for itself 
(“let the end be legitimate”), and he then seems to say so more di-
rectly (the “painful duty”).  But the word “pretext” in this passage 
adds further ambiguity.  How would the Court decide that Congress 
has passed a law under a “pretext” of acting within its enumerated 
powers?  Suppose Congress were to enact a law for the building of an 
intrastate road whose terminus was an interstate or international 
 
398 Id. 
399 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down economic regulation as 
violating rationality review) and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 
(1936) (same) with United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (uphold-
ing economic regulation under more deferentially formulated rationality review) and 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (same). 
400 Cf. Magliocca, supra note 10, at 150–51 (arguing that subsequent cases interpreted McCul-
loch as making the means-ends relationship a non-justiciable political question). 
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port.  Congress could argue that the road was “convenient” or “plain-
ly adapted” to promote interstate navigation—something Marshall 
deemed indisputably a matter of commerce.  But it might have been 
argued in the 1820s that road travel, in contrast to navigation, is not 
commerce; and that the navigation hook was a mere pretext for in-
ternal improvements—an illegitimate end that violated the “spirit” of 
the Constitution.  In order to reach such a conclusion, a court would 
have to reason that the road was not sufficiently “necessary” (“conven-
ient,” “conducive,” etc.) to navigation—thereby, judging the “degree 
of its necessity” non-deferentially.  The word “pretext” implies a lack 
of deference, a de novo second-guessing of a claimed legislative justi-
fication; and such an analysis spills over into a judgment of the rela-
tion of means to that end. 
The McCulloch opinion thus gives plenty of ammunition to both 
sides of a debate over the role of the Court and the standard which it 
will apply.  Each time Marshall claims that the Court must defer to 
Congress’s legislative choices, he tempers that claim by asserting the 
Court’s power to second guess that choice.  Unsurprisingly, McCulloch 
has frequently been cited by later Courts in non-deferential decisions, 
in just this manner, to justify striking down acts of Congress on mat-
ters that arguably fell well within its discretion about means.401  Com-
mentators have likewise disagreed about how rigorous the test is.  
While adherents of the aggressive nationalism thesis take McCulloch as 
authority for judicial deference on the question of means, some emi-
nent scholars have argued that Marshall’s test was more rigorous.  
White observes that, while McCulloch gave congressional implied pow-
er an “apparently broad scope,” Marshall took pains to point out lim-
its on implied powers so as to deny charges that he was a “consolida-
tionist.”402  Currie found McCulloch “unmistakable” in asserting that 
“incidental authority must not be so broadly construed as to subvert 
the basic principle that Congress has limited powers.”403  My point is 
 
401 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (holding the individual mandate is not sustained by the 
commerce power); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936) (striking down the 
Bituminous Coal Act); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 
20, 40 (1922) (striking down the child labor tax); United States v. Harris (The Civil 
Rights Cases), 106 U.S. 629, 635-636 (1883) (striking down the 1875 Civil Rights Act); 
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 625 (1870) (holding that Congress has no power to is-
sue paper money). 
402 WHITE, supra note 32, at 550; see also id. at 8 (“‘Consolidation’ referred to the opportuni-
ties for federal judges to usurp the prerogatives of state courts or state legislatures and 
thereby ‘consolidate’ the power of the Union.”). 
403 Currie, supra note 340, at 932. 
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not that White and Currie are necessarily correct, but rather that 
their interpretations are plausible, thereby underscoring the ambigu-
ous nature of Marshall’s purported deference to Congress. 
3.  Implied versus Enumerated Powers 
At the end of the day, the claim that McCulloch was a “sweeping” 
nationalist decision depends on implied powers and their relation-
ship to enumerated powers.  To be sure, deference to congressional 
judgments on the “degree of necessity” of a chosen means of execut-
ing an enumerated power favors a relatively broader rather than nar-
rower scope for congressional power.  But this scope, as Marshall also 
points out, occurs within the limits of the enumerated powers.  If the 
Commerce Clause is limited to regulating trade in goods plus naviga-
tion, and if the Postal Clause is construed to authorize only the selec-
tion, and not construction, of post roads, then the enumerated pow-
ers might not extend to a power to build roads. 
Marshall treads carefully to avoid committing the Court to a “lib-
eral” construction of enumerated powers.  Hamilton had argued that 
“the powers contained in a constitution of government, especially 
those which concern the general administration of the affairs of a 
country, its finances, trade, defence, &c. ought to be construed liberal-
ly, in advancement of the public good.”404  Pinkney, at oral argument 
on behalf of the Bank, had pressed the argument that “[i]t is the duty 
of the Court to construe the constitutional powers of the national 
government liberally . . . .”405  Marshall agrees with Hamilton that 
constitutional interpretation requires interpreting “the whole in-
strument”406 so as “to insure” the “beneficial execution” “of those 
great powers on which the welfare of the nation essentially de-
pends.”407  But the McCulloch opinion never uses the terms “liberal” or 
“broad” as descriptors of proper constitutional interpretation, instead 
claiming that the Constitution should be given a “fair” or “just” con-
struction.408  Certainly, Marshall could have deployed the terms “fair” 
and “just” with a wink, as if to say “my friends all understand I really 
mean ‘broad’ and ‘liberal.’”  But a fair reading of Marshall should 
 
404 8 HAMILTON, supra note 152, at 105 (emphasis added). 
405 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 386 (1819). 
406 Id. at 406. 
407 Id. at 415. 
408 Id. at 406 (“fair construction”); id. at 407 (“fair and just interpretation”); id. at 414 (“just 
construction”).  See also HOBSON, supra note 12, at 123 (arguing that Marshall’s opinion 
did not attempt to expand the power of the national government; rather, it only attempt-
ed to enable the national government to use its powers effectively). 
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start from the presumption that he meant what he said, and only find 
an unstated meaning if the context supports it. 
Despite its various references to the enumerated powers of the na-
tional government as “great,” “ample,” and “vast,”409 we misconstrue 
this language by reading it through an aggressive nationalist lens.  
These terms can have many shades of meaning, including “im-
portant; weighty,” or “chief; principal.”410  In context, these latter 
seem to be the meanings Marshall had in mind, because he used the 
terms to distinguish between the enumerated (“great”) powers and 
the secondary ones, which are means of their execution.  For exam-
ple, incorporating a bank is not found among the “enumerated” 
powers because it is not “a great substantive and independent pow-
er.”411  Marshall tells us that “[i]t can never be pretended that these 
vast [enumerated] powers draw after them others of inferior importance, 
merely because they are inferior.”412  The “vast portion of [sovereign-
ty] which is granted to the general government” clearly means “im-
portant” rather than broad in scope, because Marshall emphatically 
reminds us that the national government is “limited in its powers.”413 
Moreover, McCulloch stops short of saying that the Court should 
defer to congressional judgments interpreting the scope of the enu-
merated powers.  Here, significantly, Marshall parts ways with the 
more nationalist arguments made to the Court.  Pinkney and Webster 
did not offer extended analyses of the enumerated powers, but they 
at least put them on the table and at least implicitly suggested that 
the entire question of whether an implied power was within the scope 
of the enumerated powers was one requiring judicial deference to 
congressional judgments.414  By implication, that included deference 
to Congress’s judgment on the scope of the Clause.  Pinkney was 
more explicit, when he argued that Congress was the prima facie 
 
409 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 400 (“great operations of the government”); id. at 404 
(“great and sovereign powers”); id. at 407, 415, 421, 424 (“great powers”); id. at 408 (“vast 
powers”); id. (“ample powers, on . . . which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so 
vitally depends . . . .”); id. at 418 (“great objects”). 
410 See SAMUEL JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY, supra note 330, at 410 (noting that “great” can be 
synonymous with “chief” or “principal”); id. at 908 (explaining that “vast” can be synony-
mous with “great”). 
411 See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407, 410–11 (“Although, among the enumerated 
powers of government, we do not find the, word “bank” or “incorporation,” we find the 
great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare 
and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies.”). 
412 Id. at 407–08 (emphasis added). 
413 Id. at 406. 
414 Id. at 378–79. 
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judge of its own powers.415  For Marshall, however, the “necessary and 
proper analysis” was analytically separate from the scope of the enu-
merated powers.  We know this because he avoided analyzing the 
scope of any enumerated powers in McCulloch, so intent was he to 
avoid embroiling the Court in any controversy over their scope. 
McCulloch therefore left open the question of whether any defer-
ence should be given to Congress on interpreting the scope of enu-
merated powers.  This question was answered in Gibbons v. Ogden,416 
where Marshall once again took a moderate rather than aggressively 
nationalistic position.417 
V.  EPILOGUE:  INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS AFTER MCCULLOCH 
No case raising the constitutionality of internal improvements 
reached the Marshall Court following McCulloch.  But two further epi-
sodes of the Marshall Court shed additional light on the meaning of 
McCulloch.  The first is an interchange between Chief Jusice John 
Marshall and President James Monroe following the latter’s veto of 
the Cumberland Road Tollgate Bill.  The second is the Court’s opin-
ion in Gibbons v. Ogden. 
A.  Marshall, Monroe, and the Cumberland Road Tollgate Veto 
A significant episode in the story of McCulloch and internal im-
provements occurred outside of court, three years after McCulloch was 
issued.  The episode involved one of the largest internal improve-
ments projects to that time, the Cumberland (or National) Road. 
Started during the Jefferson administration, this multi-year federal 
project contemplated an interstate highway from Maryland to 
Ohio.418  With the still-incomplete Cumberland Road in extreme need 
of repair to its completed sections, the Senate in 1822 voted to ap-
propriate $9,000 for road repairs.419  But House members objected to 
devoting further federal tax dollars to the seemingly interminable 
project, arguing that users of the road should start bearing the cost of 
its maintenance.420  In response, the Senate proposed a bill to erect 
tollgates on the Cumberland Road and use the tolls to preserve and 
repair the road; an additional provision of the bill would make it a 
 
415 Id. 
416 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
417 See infra note 451 and accompanying text. 
418 CURRIE, supra note 182, at 114. 
419 Id. at 279. 
420 Id. 
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federal crime to evade the duty to pay the tolls.421  The use of tollgates 
for road revenues was long established on public and private roads 
within the states.  The only novelty was the federal government’s use 
of this technique.  The bill passed both houses without significant 
debate.422  On May 4, 1822, Monroe vetoed the bill, arguing in his 
short veto message that the bill implicitly asserted “a complete right 
of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes of internal im-
provement,” which Congress does not have and which cannot be 
granted by state consent.423 
In an unusual gesture, Monroe expanded on his veto message by 
issuing a 29,000 word disquisition entitled Views of the President of the 
United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements.424  Though turgid 
and littered with flawed or sketchy arguments, the essay offered one 
creative and significant piece of pragmatic constitutional reasoning.  
More significantly for students of the Marshall Court, Monroe had 
the essay printed in pamphlet form and sent to various political lu-
minaries, including the Justices of the Supreme Court.425  Three of 
the Justices, including Marshall, sent letters to Monroe in reply.  This 
incident has been reported by various legal historians as an unprece-
dented instance of the Supreme Court offering an advisory opinion 
to the President.426  Monroe’s unusual essay thus warrants considera-
tion as an important state paper, both for its own merits and for the 
light it sheds on Marshall’s constitutional thought. 
1.  Monroe’s Pamphlet 
Monroe’s pamphlet in essence offers a compromise between strict 
constructionists and pro-internal improvements nationalists, reflect-
ing both his own mixed feelings on the issue and the consensus na-
 
421 Id. 
422 Id. at 278–79. 
423 Monroe, supra note 355, at 142. 
424 Id. at 144. 
425 See DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 122–25 (1954) (noting that Monroe 
circulated the pamphlet among his friends, including the justices); 2 CHARLES WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 55–57 (1923) (noting that the pamphlet 
was received by the Justices). 
426 See HOWE, supra note 20, at 213 (discussing modern lawyers’ surprise at Justice William 
Johnson’s advisory opinion written to Monroe, advising that the federally funded internal 
improvements were constitutional); MORGAN, supra note 425, at 122–23 (noting that the 
Justices gave an almost advisory opinion in response); 2 WARREN, supra note 425, at 55–57 
(stating that the Court gave an unofficial opinion in response to the pamphlet). 
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ture of his presidency more broadly.427  Monroe argued that the 
Cumberland Road Tollgate Bill, with its provision for tollgates and 
criminal law enforcement, implied a “system of internal improve-
ment,” requiring a constellation of powers that Congress did not 
have.  These powers extended beyond merely charting and construct-
ing the road, to include also powers to condemn the underlying land; 
to build tollgates or houses and collect tolls; and to assert federal 
criminal jurisdiction over the road (to protect the road from toll eva-
sion, wanton infliction of damage and presumably robbery of passen-
gers).428 
But, Monroe argued, no such constellation of powers could be 
implied from any enumerated power.  Without naming the case, 
Monroe flagrantly disregarded McCulloch’s formulation regarding 
implied powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause:  “[w]hatever is 
absolutely necessary to the accomplishment of the object of the grant, 
though not specified, may fairly be considered as included in it.  Be-
yond this the doctrine of incidental power can not be carried.”429  
With respect to the enumerated powers argued by internal improve-
ments supporters as constitutional grounds, Monroe offered stingy 
interpretations.  For example, the power to “establish . . . post roads,” 
he argued, was merely a power to designate mail routes on existing 
roads, whose “jurisdiction and soil remain[] to the State, with a right 
in the State . . . to change the road at pleasure.” 430  In a series of un-
persuasive arguments, Monroe went on to reject the war, territories 
and commerce powers as grounds from which a road-building or in-
ternal improvements power could be implied.431  He asserted that the 
Federal Government lacked any power of eminent domain within 
state borders.432  Finally, he dismissed the Commerce Clause in a 
strange and conclusory argument.433 
 
427 Monroe’s eight years in the White House, 1817–1825, have been dubbed the “era of good 
feelings” due their veneer of consensus politics.  See HOWE, supra note 20, at 146–47 (ex-
plaining that Monroe was elected almost unanimously). 
428 Monroe, supra note 355, at 155–56, 158–59; see also Madison, supra note 220, at 142 (“A 
power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of tolls by 
penalties, implies a power to adopt and execute a complete system of internal improve-
ment.”). 
429 Monroe, supra note 355, at 158. 
430 Id. at 157. 
431 Id. at 159–62. 
432 “I believe that very few would concur in the opinion that such a power exists.”  Id. at 156.  
See also id at 168 (claiming that the national government’s “right to take [private proper-
ty] at valuation” cannot “be sustained”). 
433 Id. at 162.  Monroe baldly asserted that the clause was intended primarily to nationalize 
control over foreign commerce, and only secondarily to regulate interstate commerce.  
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Despite these strict constructionist objections, Monroe actually fa-
vored internal improvements, and wished to find some common 
ground with the nationalist wing of his party.  He threaded this con-
ceptual needle by arguing that there was a constitutionally dispositive 
difference between building a road and having jurisdiction over it.  Ju-
risdiction meant the “complete system of internal improvement” that 
was constitutionally prohibited.  But a road could be built by federal 
contractors, without pretending to carry federal jurisdiction in tow, 
by applying money appropriated under the spending power.  To sus-
tain this conclusion, Monroe adopted an interpretation of the spend-
ing power similar to the view that would be embraced by the twenti-
eth century Supreme Court:  while the spending power did not 
confer a power to regulate, it did authorize appropriations to spend 
on “great national” rather than “strictly local” purposes.434  After 
completing his constitutional analysis, Monroe renewed his call for a 
constitutional amendment, “the only mode in which” an internal im-
provements power could be granted “[i]f it is thought proper to vest 
this power in the United States.”435  But Monroe had to know, based 
on the failure of such an amendment in 1817, that such prospects 
were dim, and that the renewed call for an amendment simply under-
scored his assertion that the great regulatory powers of the govern-
ment (those other than the spending power) did not impliedly au-
thorize internal improvements. 
Monroe’s constitutional analysis was bookended by passages extol-
ling the “incalculable” “advantages which would be derived from [in-
ternal] improvements.” 436 
Good roads and canals will promote many very important national pur-
poses.  They will facilitate the operations of war, the movements of 
troops, the transportation of cannon, of provisions, and every warlike 
store, much to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the enemy in 
time of war.  Good roads will facilitate the transportation of the mail, and 
thereby promote the purposes of commerce and political intelligence 
among the people.  They will by being properly directed to these objects 
enhance the value of our vacant lands, a treasure of vast resource to the 
nation. 437 
 
Since no power over internal improvements was “mentioned or even glanced at” in the 
discussion of four international trade “measures” prior to the constitutional convention, 
he inferred that “no pretension” to such a power was “set up” with regard to foreign 
commerce.  A fortiori, it would not exist as to interstate commerce.  Id. 
434 Id. at 164–67. 
435 Id. at 179. 
436 Id. at 176–77. 
437 Id. at 167. 
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Monroe was making the point that these internal improvements 
promote the general welfare and thus come within his spending pow-
er rationale.  But especially considering that Monroe sent this pam-
phlet to the Justices, this passage comes across as a taunting challenge 
to the merely three-year-old precedent of McCulloch.  Monroe says 
quite plainly that good roads and canals are conducive, convenient, 
and well-adapted to the ends set forth in the war, postal and com-
merce powers.  If McCulloch were authoritative and binding on im-
plied powers generally then the above-quoted passage would have 
made a good case for implying a congressional power over internal 
improvements.  But for Monroe, who rejected McCulloch’s implied 
powers formula early in the essay, this paragraph implied no such 
power. 
2.  The “Advisory Opinion” 
Monroe sent copies of his internal improvements pamphlet to the 
Justices, three of whom, including Marshall, sent letters to Monroe in 
reply.  Justice Joseph Story’s response was the most appropriate ex-
ample of what we would expect from judges interacting with the po-
litical branches: 
Upon the constitutional question, I do not feel at liberty to express any 
opinion as it may hereafter perhaps come for discussion before the Su-
preme Court; but I rejoice that the wisdom and patriotism of the states-
men of our country are engaged in developing the materials for a sound 
judgment on this highly interesting subject. 438 
The “aggressive nationalist” response came from Justice William 
Johnson: 
Judge Johnson has had the Honour to submit the President’s argument 
on the subject of internal improvement to his Brother Judges and is in-
structed to make the following Report.  The Judges are deeply sensible of 
the mark of confidence bestowed on them in this instance and should be 
unworthy of the confidence did they attempt to conceal their real opin-
ion.  Indeed, to conceal or disavow it would be now impossible as they 
are all of opinion that the decision on the Bank question completely 
commits them on the subject of internal improvement, as applied to 
Postroads and Military Roads.  On the other points, it is impossible to re-
sist the lucid and conclusive reasoning in the argument.  The principle 
assumed in the case of the Bank is that the granting of the principal 
power carries with it the grant of all adequate and appropriate means of 
executing it.  That the selection of these means must rest with the Gen-
eral Government, and as to that power and those means the Constitution 
 
438 Letter from Joseph Story to James Monroe (June 24, 1822), quoted in 2 WARREN, supra 
note 425, at 56. 
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makes the Government of the U.S. supreme.  Judge Johnson would take 
the liberty of suggesting to the President that it would not be unproduc-
tive of good, if the Secretary of State were to have the opinion of this 
Court on the Bank question, printed and dispersed through the Un-
ion.439 
Johnson’s claim to be speaking for the full Court should not be taken 
at face value.  Although the historical record on this unusual incident 
is quite thin, he almost certainly was not speaking for Story or Mar-
shall, who each wrote directly to Monroe, expressing sentiments at 
odds with Johnson’s letter.440 
Here is the full text of what Marshall in fact wrote to Monroe on 
June 13, 1822: 
I have received the copy of your message to Congress on the subject of 
internal improvements which you did me the honor to transmit me, and 
thank you for it.  I have read it with great attention and interest. 
This is a question which very much divides the opinions of intelligent 
men; and it is not to be expected that there will be an entire concurrence 
in that you have expressed.441  All however will I think admit that your 
views are profound, and that you have thought deeply on the subject.  To 
me they appear to be most generally just. 
A general power over internal improvement, if to be exercised by the Un-
ion, would certainly be cumbersome to the government, & of no utility to the peo-
ple.  But, to the extent you recommend, it would be productive of no mis-
chief, and of great good.  I despair however of the adoption of such a 
measure. 
With great respect and esteem, I am sure your Obedt J Marshall442 
If we were to bend over backwards to square this letter with the ag-
gressive nationalism view of Marshall, we might say that Marshall’s 
personal views are buried in the roundabout “not . . . an entire con-
currence,” while his expressions of agreement—”most generally just” 
and “the general power”—are insincere blandishments of a Virginia 
gentleman intended only to convey politeness and respect to the 
President.  But, no.  Such an interpretation would attribute to Mar-
shall an almost unbelievable obsequiousness.  Story’s tactful refusal to 
 
439 Letter from William Johnson to James Monroe, quoted in 2 WARREN, supra note 425, at 56–
57. 
440 Charles Warren apparently did take Johnson’s claim to be speaking for “his Brother 
Judges” at face value.  Without any additional evidence, Warren assumed that Johnson 
“obtained the views of his associates” and that the letter—though undated—was written 
after the Marshall and Story letters.  See 2 WARREN, supra note 425, at 56 & n.1 (stating 
that Judge Johnson had obtained the views of his associates). 
441 [Sic].  “ . . . in all that you have expressed”?  The meaning is the same either way.  Letter 
from John Marshall to James Monroe (June 13, 1822), reproduced in 9 THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL 236 (Charles F. Hobson, ed., 1998) [hereinafter MARSHALL PAPERS]. 
442 Id. (emphasis added). 
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engage in substance with Monroe underscores that Marshall easily 
could, and should, have ended his letter after “you have thought 
deeply on the subject.”  Story’s and Johnson’s letters both demon-
strate that inter-branch courtesy did not demand insincere expres-
sions of agreement. 
But quibbling over whether Marshall actually held nationalist 
views on internal improvements but hid them in the Monroe letter, 
misses the larger point.  Whether sincere or not, the letter plainly 
conveys broad approval of Monroe’s essay, and by implication, his ve-
to.  Marshall distinguishes himself (“To me . . .”) from those who 
would disagree with Monroe.  The third paragraph suggests more 
specific approval of Monroe’s argument that the Constitution author-
izes internal improvements only in a limited fashion via the spending 
power.  It is not completely clear what Marshall means by a “general 
power over internal improvement.”  Such a power is not enumerated, 
but an aggressively nationalistic interpretation of implied powers 
could easily imply such a general power from the Commerce Clause.  
Most major internal improvements projects were, at bottom, intend-
ed to promote trade and intercourse among the states.  Thus, an in-
ternal improvement power implied from the Commerce Clause 
would have supported something quite general—to an aggressive na-
tionalist, anyway.  But Marshall suggests that such a purported im-
plied power would be “cumbersome” and “of no utility to the peo-
ple,” phrasing that sounds a lot like the negation of “conducive, well 
adapted, essential”—that is to say, not necessary and proper to any 
enumerated power.443 
Johnson’s letter to Monroe has been fairly referred to by several 
historians as an “advisory opinion.”444  No one has ever suggested that 
Marshall’s, too, was an advisory opinion.445  Yet it was, and one with 
much greater potential to damage the fabric of Marshall’s supposed 
positions and the principles of McCulloch.  Would Monroe have dis-
missed Marshall’s expressions as meaningless polite blandishments?  
Would he have read the letter’s ambiguity as a cagey expression of 
nationalism?  It seems much more likely that Monroe would have 
 
443 The last two sentences in Marshall’s third paragraph (“But, to the extent you recommend 
. . . .”) are ambiguous.  Do they refer to Monroe’s spending power proposal, or to his 
suggestion for a constitutional amendment?  Both possibilities refer to a narrower ap-
proach to internal improvements than “a general power.” 
444 See HOWE, supra note 20, at 213 (describing as advisory Justice Johnson’s opinion to Mon-
roe on the constitutionality of internal improvements). 
445 Hobson, for example, says just the opposite.  “Story, like JM [Marshall], was circumspect, 
refusing to express an opinion on the constitutional question . . . .”  9 MARSHALL PAPERS, 
supra note 441, at 237 n. 2. 
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read the letter self-servingly, as an endorsement from the nation’s 
highest judicial authority of his veto and constitutional reasoning.  
After all, Monroe sent out the pamphlet precisely to persuade the na-
tion’s leaders.  Marshall’s letter could only have encouraged Monroe 
to pursue the same course with future legislation. 
Marshall must have known that his letter could have this effect; it 
is thus puzzling that he would have sent the letter in that form if it 
really contradicted his views.  Interestingly, a few years after the letter 
to Monroe, Marshall expressed a view similar to Johnson’s in a private 
letter to Timothy Pickering:  a congressional power over internal im-
provements “for military purposes or for the transportation of the 
mail” could “be exercised to great advantage, and, there is much rea-
son for thinking, consistently with the constitution.”446  But I care less 
about his privately expressed beliefs than what he was willing to say 
about internal improvements and McCulloch.  In neither the Monroe 
nor Pickering letters did Marshall suggest that McCulloch or any other 
decision committed the Court on the question of internal improve-
ments.  Johnson plainly demonstrated that a legal thinker of the time 
could indeed apply McCulloch’s analysis of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to various enumerated powers to sustain a congressional pow-
er to build and maintain the National Road.  But the fact is that noth-
ing in McCulloch expressly adopted such an interpretation.  As we 
have seen, Marshall took pains to avoid engagement with questions of 
internal improvements.  Whatever it does and does not tell us about 
Marshall’s personal beliefs, the exchange with Monroe suggests at 
least that, when it counted, Marshall was reluctant to promote a read-
ing of McCulloch as constitutional authority for internal improve-
ments.447 
B.  Gibbons v. Ogden 
This chapter of the McCulloch story would not be complete with-
out at least a brief mention of Gibbons v. Ogden.  There, the Marshall 
Court for the first time interpreted the scope of the commerce pow-
er, and held that commerce included navigation.  In an opinion that 
does not cite McCulloch even once, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the 
argument that the enumerated powers should be strictly construed, 
but neither did he embrace the argument that they should be liberal-
 
446 Marshall to Timothy Pickering (March 18, 1828), quoted in HOBSON, supra note 12, at 124 
& 231 n. 23. 
447 Did the Court?  Perhaps only Justice Johnson.  See supra notes 439–40 and accompanying 
text. 
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ly or deferentially construed.  Marshall might have written an opinion 
saying that “Congress could reasonably conclude that commerce in-
cluded navigation,” thereby establishing deference to congressional 
judgments on the scope of enumerated powers.  Or he might even 
have declined to place definitional limits on the commerce power by 
treating the case as an implied powers question, and holding that 
trade licenses could be construed by a reasonable Congress as “plain-
ly adapted” to promoting commerce.  Instead, Marshall decided that 
the Court must “settle the meaning of the word” “commerce.”448  The 
holding of Gibbons, while giving a victory to federal power, implicitly 
asserted non-deferential review over the interpretation of enumerat-
ed powers. 
At oral argument, Daniel Webster had pressed for giving broad 
scope to the Commerce Clause in either of two ways.  One was to 
construe the clause broadly:  “the words used in the constitution, ‘to 
regulate commerce,’ are so very general and extensive, that they 
might be construed to cover a vast field of legislation.”449  The other 
was to treat the definition of commerce as open-ended: 
It was in vain to look for a precise and exact definition of the powers of 
Congress, on several subjects.  The constitution did not undertake the 
task of making such exact definitions.  In conferring powers, it proceed-
ed in the way of enumeration, stating the powers conferred, one after 
another; in few words; and, where the power was general, or complex in 
its nature, the extent of the grant must necessarily be judged of, and lim-
ited, by its object, and by the nature of the power.450 
Presumably, such an approach would give Congress wide legislative 
authority to exercise implied powers.  This seems consistent with leg-
islative precedent, in which it was taken for granted that regulating 
navigation was necessary and proper to regulating commerce. 
Marshall’s approach was narrower, however.  We can start with 
Marshall’s famous quip, in which he praises Webster’s argument—
and immediately proceeds to ignore it: 
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as 
was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to 
ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the 
meaning of the word.451 
Webster’s point was just the opposite:  that “commerce” cannot and 
should not be precisely defined.  But Marshall insists on defining it—
”to settle the meaning of the word”—and he does so in characteristic 
 
448 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189. 
449 Id. at 14. 
450 Id. at 10–11 (emphasis omitted). 
451 Id. at 189. 
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fashion, adopting a middling view.  Marshall rejects the argument 
limiting commerce to “traffic” or “interchange of commodities,” but 
“settles” the definition as “commercial intercourse.”  While it is not 
exactly clear what “intercourse” entails—does it include banking, for 
example?—Marshall does explain that it includes passenger naviga-
tion.  This is not an expansive definition of commerce—it is just 
broad enough to resolve the case, and leaves unclear whether the 
door is open to further expansion.  Whatever intercourse is, by “set-
tling” the meaning of commerce, Marshall adopts a position less ex-
pansive than that urged by Webster. 
Marshall’s decision to eschew an implied powers approach is an-
other instance of his steering clear of the internal improvements 
question.  As in McCulloch, Marshall seemed determined to avoid tak-
ing a position that would commit the Court on the question of build-
ing roads.  If navigation had been analyzed as “necessary and proper” 
to a more general power over commerce—a power whose limits are 
left open, as Webster had urged—then it would be a logical next step 
to argue that road-building was likewise an implied power.  Naviga-
tion and road building are both transportation, after all.  In Gibbons, 
once again, Marshall refused to acknowledge the legislative prece-
dent of congressional laws building navigational aids.  Although now 
directly relevant to the question of the scope of the commerce power, 
to explicitly acknowledge that commerce implies a power to build 
navigational infrastructure might suggest a power to build roads as 
well.  To be sure, an argument for a road-building power could be 
constructed out of Gibbons on the theory that commerce includes 
overland “intercourse” as well as intercourse on rivers, coastal waters 
and seas.  At the same time, opponents of roads could plausibly cite 
Gibbons for the proposition that commerce defined as trade plus nav-
igation does not encompass the power to build roads, which differ 
from navigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom holds that McCulloch is a “nation-
building” opinion, one that offers expansive interpretations of the 
powers of Congress.  This “aggressive nationalism” interpretation 
reads McCulloch to set forth a doctrine that implicitly pre-approves na-
tional infrastructure projects (“internal improvements”), that sup-
ports generous interpretations of enumerated powers, and that en-
dorses Hamiltonian political economy or some other constitutional 
“vision” of expansive congressional power. 
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But the aggressive nationalism thesis misreads McCulloch.  As we 
have seen, Chief Justice John Marshall was far more concerned with 
avoiding controversy than with affirmatively endorsing expansive 
congressional power.  McCulloch did little to suggest, let alone lead 
Congress into, assertions of constitutional power over internal im-
provements, monetary policy, or broadly-conceived regulation of 
commercial activity.  McCulloch upheld the constitutionality of the Se-
cond Bank, an institution supported by nationalists but also by main-
stream Jeffersonians, including President Madison.  To be sure, by af-
firming the constitutionality of the Bank, McCulloch upheld an 
institution that could and did assert broad monetary powers.  But 
Marshall’s opinion says nothing about the Bank’s exercise of such 
powers—not even to acknowledge the Bank’s power to issue the very 
banknotes that gave rise to the litigation.  Instead, he explicitly men-
tions only its “fiscal operations.” 
Marshall’s opinion reflects a determination to steer clear of all 
other controversial questions of national power.  He refused to em-
brace arguments to sustain the Second Bank under the Commerce 
Clause, or any other identifiable enumerated power, thus avoiding 
the need to construe any enumerated power broadly.  He also ig-
nored the argument that the national government had an implied 
power to impose a uniform national currency and regulate the mon-
ey supply.  In discussing congressional power in McCulloch, Marshall 
assiduously avoided saying anything that would imply support for in-
ternal improvements legislation.  While McCulloch said nothing to af-
firmatively discourage Congress from undertaking aggressively na-
tionalistic legislative initiatives, it also said nothing to encourage such 
legislation.  Marshall can hardly be described as a national builder 
when he would not even commit to building a road. 
McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers also falls short of the ag-
gressive nationalist interpretation.  Marshall’s simple distinction be-
tween “great” and “inferior” powers, with implied powers falling into 
the inferior category, fails to allow for the existence of implied pow-
ers that might be parallel in importance to some enumerated ones—
for example, a federal power over the money supply.  At the same 
time, Marshall’s ambiguous statements about the relative roles of 
Congress and the Court in deciding whether Congress has a particu-
lar implied power, and his profusion of words and phrases to charac-
terize the “necessary and proper” test for implied powers, creates an 
ambiguous legacy regarding the proper extent of judicial deference 
to congressional judgments about the scope of national powers.  Fi-
nally, Marshall refused to expressly embrace the argument pressed by 
Hamilton, Webster, and Wirt that constitutional powers did not de-
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pend for their existence on contingencies or temporary crises.  In-
stead, Marshall used ambiguous language, equally or perhaps even 
more supportive of Madison’s view that an implied constitutional 
power expired with the passing of the emergency. 
At the end of the day, McCulloch’s nationalism is quite limited and 
middle-of-the-road.  Undoubtedly, Marshall’s rejection of the strict 
constructionist approach to implied powers made him more of a na-
tionalist than Madison and Monroe.  But the aggressive nationalism 
thesis places Marshall squarely in the midst of American statesmen 
who acted affirmatively to expand national territory, infrastructure, 
wealth and power.  But Marshall refused in McCulloch to adopt the 
arguments of such statesmen as Hamilton, Calhoun, and Clay.  He 
can therefore hardly be classified as their equal in nationalism. 
Many colleagues who have reviewed drafts of this Article have re-
sisted my conclusion by making one or more of the following argu-
ments.  My test of aggressive nationalism calls for dicta that would 
have been out of place in a judicial opinion; Marshall displayed 
sound judicial craft by asserting positions no more nationalistic than 
necessary to resolve the Bank’s constitutionality; and, by not taking 
sides in a debate between aggressive nationalists (Hamilton, Calhoun, 
Clay) and conservative nationalists (Madison, Monroe), Marshall was 
cleverly husbanding the prestige of a vulnerable Supreme Court. 
Significantly, arguments of this type don’t rescue the aggressive 
nationalism thesis, but retreat from it to something else:  Marshall the 
judicious statesman, rather than Marshall the nation-builder.  It is 
certainly possible that, in McCulloch, Marshall hid some aggressively 
nationalistic personal opinions behind a screen of moderate national-
ism; but a decision written in moderately nationalistic terms is hardly 
evidence of aggressively nationalistic views.  Nor is it true that judicial 
craft requires eschewing the most forceful or far-reaching arguments 
available to a court in resolving a constitutional controversy; that re-
quirement only applies if the Court’s goal is to avoid the forceful, far-
reaching position.  Nor would it have been dicta to acknowledge the 
Bank’s power to issue banknotes as a uniform national currency—
since its banknotes were precisely at issue in the case—nor to sustain 
that power under the Commerce Clause.  And as for not taking sides, 
Marshall may have had good reason to avoid that, but the aggressive 
nationalism thesis asserts quite bluntly that he did take sides, with the 
aggressive nationalists.  Finally, it might be argued that Marshall’s ju-
dicial statesmanship in McCulloch was importantly institution-
building.  Perhaps so.  But building up the power and prestige of the 
Court is only nation-building if nation-building doctrines emanate 
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from the Court:  on that point, the record seems to be decidedly 
mixed. 
Let me be clear:  my argument in this Article is not one about the 
proper interpretation of the Constitution, and the doctrine of im-
plied powers in particular, but one about the proper interpretation of 
Marshall and his signature judicial opinion.  It may be that the ag-
gressive nationalism understanding of implied powers and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause is correct—I am inclined to believe it is.  But, 
as I have tried to argue, McCulloch is not the true or the best source of 
that understanding.  The most historically accurate and textually 
faithful reading of McCulloch tracks closely with William Nelson’s ap-
praisal of Marshall as a jurist who tended to announce only constitu-
tional principles around which there was a substantial consensus.  
Where constitutional questions provoked deep controversy and 
lacked a clear consensus, Marshall would classify them as matters for 
the political branches.452  Other legal historians have rightly described 
Marshall as a moderate rather than aggressive jurist, on whom the 
aggressive nationalist mantle does not fit well.453 
If McCulloch did not—as advertised—lay a foundation for the great 
expansion of federal legislative power in the twentieth century, then 
the question then arises:  why is McCulloch advertised in that way?  
The answer to that question is complex, and requires article length 
treatment in itself.  Here, I can offer some speculations.  My research 
into this question suggests that McCulloch’s contemporary reputation 
is the result of two waves of attention lavished on Marshall long after 
his death.  The first came in the late 1890s and culminated in “John 
Marshall Day,” on February 4, 1901.454  This brainchild of the Ameri-
can Bar Association was a nationwide celebration of the centennial of 
Marshall’s assumption of the Chief Justiceship, marked by speeches 
and court closures around the country, as well as a presidential proc-
lamation.  It was shortly followed by several Marshall biographies.  
These events roughly coincided with significant public backlash 
against the Court for its aggressive use of judicial review to strike 
down progressive economic legislation, such as the Sherman Anti-
trust Act and the federal income tax.  The second wave, led by Felix 
Frankfurter and other New Deal lawyers and academics, started dur-
 
452 Nelson, supra note 26, at 924–25. 
453 HOBSON, supra note 12, at 123; WHITE, supra note 32, at 486, 594; Newmyer, supra note 
34, at 886–87. 
454 ADOLPH MOSES, “JOHN MARSHALL DAY”:  SERIES OF LETTERS AND ENDORSEMENTS IN 
ANSWER TO CIRCULAR ADVOCATING THE CELEBRATION OF “JOHN MARSHALL DAY,” 
FEBRUARY 4, 1901, at 7–8 (1899). 
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ing the Court crisis of the 1930s.  That intellectual movement sought 
to preserve the Court’s role as the ultimate interpreter of the Consti-
tution while, at the same time, deferring to Congress on economic 
questions and allowing for an expansive understanding of the scope 
of national legislative power. 
I believe that Marshall’s reputation was reconstructed first, to put 
a face on aggressive judicial review, and later, to put a face on judicial 
self-restraint cum nationalism.  As his biographers vividly showed, 
Marshall was an unusually accomplished man who led a fascinating 
life and compared favorably to the men of dubious judgment (Taney 
and Chase) and mediocrities (Waite, Fuller, and White) who followed 
him.  Institutions need heroes to build loyalty.  But because this hero 
was a judge whose most significant deeds are written legal opinions, 
the human face needs a case to go with it. McCulloch’s ambiguity 
made it a suitable vehicle for both the judicial supremacy and the ju-
dicial self-restraint/nationalism projects.  But the complete telling of 
this story is for another day. 
One final note is in order.  The argument that Marshall’s nation-
alism has been exaggerated, and McCulloch misread, is not an attack 
on Marshall.  It is hardly his fault that he has been elevated into a 
mythic symbol, that his interpretations of the Constitution on some 
questions (but not others) have been taken as more authoritative 
than the Framers’ understanding or the words of the Constitution 
themselves, and that debates over the meaning of the powers of Con-
gress are at times played out as debates over the meaning of Mar-
shall’s opinions in Gibbons and McCulloch.  We would do well to re-
member, at those times, Marshall’s own words, that it is not an entry 
in the U.S. Reports, but rather “a constitution we are expounding.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
